

Japan's Price for Peace

The

Reporter

September 18, 1951 25c

Treatymaker Dulles



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In the Hill Country of Kentucky

'These are a simple people, poorly educated but honest and courageous; proud, friendly to strangers; loyal to friends; no more hotheaded than most, but once aroused much more inclined to settle matters with a rifle. . . .' (see page 17)





THE REPORTER'S NOTES

LAUGHTER IN THE SENATE

On August 24, in a closed session of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada raised a point of personal privilege. He said the State Department was sending this magazine, among others, to its embassies and information centers overseas. Senator McCarran objected to the inclusion of *The Reporter*, principally on the ground that the issue of August 21 contained an article which judged certain of his activities harshly. For this reason, Senator McCarran moved a \$22-million cut in funds for the State Department information program. The committee voted the cut.

Three days later, when the measure came before the full Senate, Senator McCarran repeated his reservations about allowing *The Reporter* a place among scores of other American magazines in U.S. information centers.

"Perhaps I should be especially interested in this headline," he said, brandishing a copy. "The headline is 'McCarran's Monopoly.' Listen to this: 'The Nevada Senator has become judge, prosecutor, and hangman in loyalty cases. . . . The chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee has, over the last six months, managed to establish himself as grand inquisitor and lord high executioner in charge of the extirpation of heresy.'" At this point, according to the *New York Times*, there was laughter on the floor.

WE WISH we had space to publish a full account of the debate as it appeared the next day in the *Congressional Record*. Unfortunately, we are obliged to abbreviate it considerably, leaving out many of the more inane as well as some of the highly intelligent remarks of the Senators.

Senator McCarran objected to the use of taxpayers' money to send publications abroad which show "how we quarrel among ourselves." He felt that no good could come of sending "that kind of stuff out to the world, to be absorbed, so that Russia can say, 'Look for yourselves. They are grappling at each other's throats in America. They are calling each other names in America.' If that is the kind of stuff we want to send abroad, I surrender."

Senator Benton of Connecticut pointed out that Senator McCarran "has read the magazine *Life*, the magazine *Time*, and other magazines, which advocates the dismissal of Secretary Acheson. Would he suggest that as a reason why *Life* magazine, for example, should not be sent to our information libraries abroad?"

Senator McCarran replied: "I have not paid any attention to it."

Senator Mundt of South Dakota said later:

"The *Saturday Evening Post* for April 28, 1951 went to 169 overseas information offices and contained an article by the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCarran] on the subject 'Why Should Not the Spanish Fight for Us?' and giving the State Department 'unshirred hades.' I do not think we should have a censorship by the State Department which would protect the Senator or me or the Department itself from any particular criticism. I am sure if we are to be criticized we would much rather be criticized in Calcutta than in Las Vegas, Nev., or Rapid City, S. Dak. [Laughter]."

Senator MacMahon of Connecticut eventually raised what may well have been the decisive point.

"The question," he said, "is whether we are going to set up a censorship by the Appropriations Committee of the United States Senate with respect to

the material which goes to the embassies and legations of the United States throughout the earth. That is a very dangerous thesis, Mr. President.

"But I should like to get away from *The Reporter* for a moment. I have read very few issues. The ones I have read I have found interesting. I agree with some of them, and with some I do not agree. I find myself, as I imagine the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and all Members of this body find themselves, in agreement and disagreement with much of that which is printed in the periodicals and press of the United States. But, Mr. President, that is the free way. It is the American way. It is not the Soviet way, which is the way of uniformity imposed upon everyone on peril of being liquidated, of being taken to Siberia, if he does not subscribe to it. May there never be a Siberia in the United States of America applied to the minds of men."

THAT puts it very well. We still have some quarrel with Senator McCarran, who passed a few murky observations (which we have refrained from quoting) about our editorial policy. We would also like to chide the State Department for hastily, too hastily, withdrawing the offending issue from overseas distribution. But we are glad, at any rate, that the Senate voted, 52-16, to restore the cut in the information program's funds.

'McCARRAN'S MONOPOLY'

Anyone who missed "McCarran's Monopoly" by Alan Barth, the article on the Senator's operations as head of the new Internal Security Committee, which set off the squabble—and which we are proud to have published—may receive a copy simply by dropping us a post card.

CORRESPONDENCE

FUTURE OR PRESENT?

To the Editor: As a reader of long standing, I feel myself entitled to a strong complaint from time to time. I hereby severely criticize just one important point in Ray Bradbury's "The Pedestrian," in your August 21 issue.

The year 2131 A.D. is ridiculous. It should be 1951.

JOHN B. MAYOR
Washington

To the Editor: Recently I had an experience similar to Ray Bradbury's "The Pedestrian."

I was strolling down a Chicago street at high noon, reading *The New York Times*, when a couple of plainclothesmen stepped out of a parked car, flashed their badges, and began frisking me.

"Where's your wallet?"

"I don't carry one."

"Why not?"

"It's a free country, I don't need a passport."

"What if you were run over by a car?"

"What if I were?"

"They wouldn't know where to take you."

"I hope they'd have the sense to take me to a hospital."

"What're you, a wise guy?"

They asked my name and address and I told them.

"How come you're carrying all these New York papers?"

"A lot of Chicago news doesn't get into Chicago papers."

"Like what?"

"Like the crime quiz and these race riots."

"Get into the car. What are you walking around in Chicago for if you live out in Cicero?"

"I told you. I went to the Loop to get the New York papers. When I got off the trolley, there was no bus for Cicero coming, so I decided to walk."

"How come you're walking on a side street and not on the boulevard?"

"Too much carbon monoxide; makes me sick."

"You got bad lungs?"

"No, but I had pneumonia twice in the Army and can't stand that gas."

"Overseas?"

"I was wounded in Germany."

"Rugged, huh?"

The car turned into an alley behind an apartment house.

One of them got out and talked to a janitor, who said I was not the one who robbed an apartment last night.

"O.K., you can go, but don't go strolling down any side street. Creates suspicion."

I walked slowly away as the two clean-cut public eyes drove away in their sedan.

JOHN FONTANY
Cicero, Illinois

THE HARTMAN ARTICLE

To the Editor: The quotation you attribute to *Advertising Age* in your story on The Fashion Academy in the August 21 issue reminds me of the classic movie advertising device of cutting a word or section out of a caustic review in order to make it seem favorable. In similar fashion the critic who writes of a movie that it is an "amazing distortion of history to provide a colorful plot" is apt to discover in an ad that the movie is "amazing . . . colorful"—and that he said so.

According to *The Reporter*, *Advertising Age* called The Fashion Academy award "one of the most effective merchandising devices of the postwar period . . ." So we did, but let's look at the sentence that clause was taken from: "This startling shift in the handling of the awards, on which some \$50,000,000 of national advertising has been spent—and which have proved to be one of the most effective merchandising devices of the postwar period—stems from the atmosphere of suspicion in which the awards have operated."

Your writer, Robert K. Bingham, didn't excerpt that sentence, he emasculated it.

Since Bingham obviously saw our story, which included such facts as (1) that the awards may be given up; (2) how the scholarships were solicited; (3) that we didn't talk to any winners who *hadn't* contributed scholarships; (4) that Hartman is having considerable difficulty with the New York State Department of Education over his scholarships, it is annoying to discover that we are only credited with an admiring quotation.

From reading your article, it's fairly clear that the selected quotation wasn't the only information your writer found worthwhile, and the laudatory quotation selected gives a completely false impression of the nature of *Advertising Age's* story.

JOHN CRICHTON
Executive Editor,
Advertising Age
New York City

[We quoted *Advertising Age* not as approving or disapproving the validity of the Hartman award procedure, but as recognizing its effectiveness. Bingham got most of his information through extended interviews with Mr. Hartman and various people who have dealt with him. He did not read the *Advertising Age* article, which incidentally he admired very much, until after

he had completed the very nearly final draft of his own.—The Editors.]

NONSCHEDULED AIRLINES

To the Editor: The "blonde hostess" in David Kenyon Webster's article, "Madman, I Love You," in the August 21 issue of *The Reporter*, was speaking for the entire non-scheduled air-carrier industry when she said that "we get blamed" for everything unreliable independent ticket agencies do.

While Webster cashed in on the maltreatment he received from "Madman Maloney" by selling the story to you, this matter always arouses the utmost anger, together with a feeling of futility, on the part of our Aircotech Transport Association, Inc., because we have spent tens of thousands of dollars and untold effort to clean up an irresponsible independent ticket-agency situation for which nonscheduled carriers are not responsible but for which they are continually maligned.

A.C.T.A. has appealed to the Civil Aeronautics Board on numerous occasions to grant authority to nonscheduled carriers to advertise openly without being charged with holding out as "route-type" operators so that the independent ticket-agency situation, the source of the gross misrepresentation on which Webster bases his article, can be eliminated. The board, thus far, has refused our pleas.

However, I am glad to report that since A.C.T.A.'s "police" campaign was launched two years ago, two of the largest national independent ticket agencies, which were also two of the most flagrant violators of ethical business practices among the agencies generating traffic for unscheduled carriers, have gone out of business.

While he may have been inconvenienced somewhat, Webster can be sure of one thing: His nonscheduled flight was the safest ride he could have taken at any price. During the past two years the nonscheduled carriers completed over 1.5 billion passenger miles without a fatal accident. This is a better safety record than the scheduled airlines, trains, busses, taxicabs, and even kiddie cars.

Should your man Webster desire to take another transcontinental flight I would be more than happy to arrange transportation for him on one of the many nonscheduled carriers operating all-plush, four-engined equipment (with television) to prove that the flight he pictures in his article is the exception rather than the rule.

ERIC SMITH
Director of Public Relations,
Aircotech Transport Association, Inc.
Washington

The Reporter

A FORTNIGHTLY OF FACTS AND IDEAS

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in this issue . . .

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Our guest editorial for this issue is contributed by **Herbert Elliston**, Editor of the *Washington Post*. His size-up of the Japanese treaty negotiations was written several days before the San Francisco conference. . . . **Romney Wheeler**, now director of the National Broadcasting Company's London office, served under General MacArthur in Japan as chief of the book-translation program. . . . **R. E. Lapp**, a frequent contributor to this magazine on atomic matters, wrote *Must We Hide?* . . . **Reinhold Niebuhr** is Dean of the Faculty at the Union Theological Seminary. . . . **William S. Fairfield**, a Washington reporter, contributes frequently to *The Reporter*. . . . **Max Seham**, a member of the board of directors of the Committee for the Nation's Health, has practiced medicine in Minneapolis since 1916. . . . **George Weller**, a winner of the Pulitzer Prize, is a foreign correspondent for the *Chicago Daily News*. . . . **Patrick O'Donovan** writes for the *London Observer*. . . . **William P. Clancy** has taught English literature at the University of Detroit and at Notre Dame. . . . **Norman Thomas**, veteran leader of the Socialist Party, wrote *A Socialist's Faith*. . . . Cover by **San Bon Matsui**; inside cover photographs from *Wide World* and *Black Star*.

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The Hazards of Ceremony

WHO IN THE stratosphere of our diplomatic hierarchy thought up the notion of a conference on the peace treaty for Japan? No scribe seems to be sure. Was it John Foster Dulles, anxious to top off a long and laborious, even brilliant, diplomatic negotiation with a formal triumph? Was it the strategist of the Voice of America, eager for a forum from which to plug the "Treaty of Reconciliation" into the ears of attending Asiatics? The insiders are silent. For the blunt fact is that the brain wave, by no matter whom, is now seen as a blunder worse than a crime. It needed only the announcement of the Russian intention to attend the parley, instead of, as expected, boycotting it, to make this instantaneously clear. In the State Department itself it had a numbing effect.

Everything had been cut and dried—on the assumption that the Russians would stay away. The draft treaty had been put in the hands of the interested parties—a document to which all of them, save only the Russians, had contributed. Except for the Russians, with their eternal *Nyet*, all of them could see in the peace compact the mark of their views. If the mark was not clear and complete, that was because the various views had been toned down and then fused under the expert ministrations of Mr. Dulles. All that remained to be done was to let the delegates make a few speeches at each other, sign on the dotted line, and enjoy the hospitality of the Golden Gate and a world *conversazione* sans the Russians. Why, then, a formal conference?

Remnant of Revenge

Even the American view of what should be demanded of Japan was screened in compromise. Take two clauses of the draft treaty by way of example—Article 2 and Article 11. If we had seen to it that our own desires prevailed, these two provisions in all likelihood would not have appeared. Under the Yalta pact the string of islands which like a causeway join Japan's Hokkaido with Russia's Kamchatka were given to the Russians. In the draft treaty the

cession is ratified under Article 2. However, the Yalta conferees did not make a distinction between the Southern and the Northern Kuriles, and the Russians promptly occupied every one of them. Since then, they have policed the Japanese fishing fleet as it moves to and from the eastward seaboard of Japan into the Sea of Okhotsk. The Japanese had been hoping that the distinction between the two groups—one always Japanese; the other sometimes Russian, sometimes Japanese—would be made in the draft treaty. They had been encouraged by Mr. Dulles in pre-treaty talks in which he had shown sympathy for the Japanese feeling. But the draft treaty seems to lump the Kuriles together for disposition to the Russians.

Article 11 perpetuates the injustices of the trials of the war criminals. There is a growing feeling of distaste about the way that, in deference to Moscow, we participated in this travesty of justice and statecraft. However, we yielded to other nations, and the article remains—a vestigial remnant of revenge—to sully reconciliation.

Without a doubt we have bent over backward in recognizing all parties at interest, and, except for our insistence that Japan proper should be given back to the Japanese, and every opportunity afforded the Japanese to make their country a going concern again, we have taken all positions into account. The treaty is high testimony to Mr. Dulles.

The attempt will be made, in spite of the Russians, to keep the proceedings in San Francisco cut and dried. The problem is: Will the Russians let us? If past experience is any indication, they will not. Everybody in San Francisco will be reminded of the Conference of 1945 which set up the United Nations. In that hopeful year, with a brave new world struggling to be born, the filibustering Russians tortured the parley in the initial stage about procedure. The demand, for instance, came from Molotov that the chairmanship should be a rotating affair on the Russian model of a presidium.

No doubt the Americans can be relied upon to keep a grip on the chairmanship, but there is

another snag which will be more difficult to overcome. That, of course, is the problem of Red China. In 1945 the Russians knocked at the door of San Francisco's Opera House (the site of both conferences) in behalf of the Lublin Poles. The Lublin Poles of the present conference are the Red Chinese.

The Ghost at the Banquet

It so happens that the Red Chinese have, if not more friends, at least more supporters of their claim to admittance to world society than the Lublin Poles had in 1945. It is on the question of Red China that the United States is rapidly getting into a posture of what some of our nationalist Senators would be pleased to call "splendid isolation." We have few friends in Asia for our nonrecognition policy, and support in Europe on this question is tepid. Red China would have been the ghost at the Conference, anyway. With Russia joining in, Red China will be a very lively ghost—especially as the Russians seem bound to link the issue of peace or war with the relation of Red China to the peace treaty with Japan.

The news from Kaesong bears out this interpretation. There can be no other meaning in the bare-faced charges with which the Communists are impeding truce progress. All that has been done since the Kaesong parley started six weeks ago is to agree upon the agenda. Item No. 2 on the agenda has to do with the cease-fire line. It is bound to remain in suspended animation while the Red negotiators are watching the outcome at San Francisco. Since Soviet Russia cannot or will not deliver the men and material that Red China has asked for, Soviet Russia has the more need to deliver diplomacy in behalf of Red China at San Francisco. In that way the Chinese will hope to get what they were unable to establish on the Kaesong agenda—a Far Eastern settlement as part of the price of a cease-fire. That is the way that the Russians could bedevil the San Francisco meeting.

Fortunately there is no likelihood that the Communist play will make the slightest difference to our politico-military conduct in Korea. Liaison on terms in Korea and on action in case of a breakdown is perfect—between the Pentagon and the State Department on the one hand and Ridgway and Van Fleet on the other. No crossed signals have occurred since MacArthur left.

To be sure, a little misunderstanding arose on the Chinese side over Secretary Acheson's testimony on the 38th Parallel at the MacArthur hearing. But the text does not bear out the Chinese attempt to misconstrue it. Never have we said we would dig in at the 38th Parallel. A truce line must be militarily defensible line and that is what our present

position is. If we ever get to the stage of an armistice (which calls for U.N. inspection), the stage after a cease-fire, the line may be subject to change.

But this is not imminent—not by a long shot. In the meantime Admiral Turner Joy is doing a first-rate job in matching patience and plain talk against Communist stonewallism. The evidence of this is the better feeling that for the time being the U.N. nations entertain about the way we are now handling affairs in Korea. Ultimately, of course, they will be needling us again about a political settlement based on realities, but right now they are satisfied over the means we are employing in breaking down the will-to-resist in Korea. There is a quiet confidence that our representatives in Korea will not get rattled or go off half-cocked. This is a better background for San Francisco than the background that MacArthur would have provided. However, the pressure from Moscow at San Francisco for a relaxation on a political settlement will certainly be felt by all non-Americans.

Memories of the Danube

The Russians will not succeed in breaking up the parley at the Golden Gate on this or any other score. The United States and Britain, co-sponsors of the conference, would sign the treaty if nobody else did. And they can muster enough influence to promote a procession of signatories. That the music will be the rat-tat-tat of intermittent shooting and argument in Korea will make no difference to the outcome at San Francisco.

The Russians know this well enough. They know in advance they cannot shake American leadership. At the same time they can be assured that they will make a deep impression of many of the Asiatic contingents, and, what is more important to them, they know they have a heaven-sent chance to steal the propaganda show in Asia. This is the best opportunity that the Russians have had since the war.

Even before the opening, they have had a success. What else is Nehru's neutralist decision not to get caught in the middle of what he fears will be another Russo-American tussle?

The unhappy fact is that, as the result of our decision to promote a ceremonial get-together, we have been put in precisely the same position as the Russians themselves occupied in the postwar Danubian Conference. That was a Russian show for the riparian and other interested powers, which those powers were privileged to attend, but only for the purpose of signing on the dotted line when Vishinsky called the roll. We quit rather than endure the railroading. At San Francisco the situation looks similar. Each delegation is to be allowed an hour for formal comment. Discussion on points of order

is prohibited. Any debate is to be so limited that the delegates may get away, if possible, by September 8, or four days after the proceedings begin.

The comparison, we know, will be unfair. But will it look that way to the world as it watches the steamroller in operation? That is the problem. It will look like Vishinsky at the rostrum. It will appear as if the westerner—the white man, in other words—is merely staging a fixed-up job, and merely indulging in a bit of play acting at a way station en route to Ottawa, where, on September 15, real business is due to be transacted in the shape of an extension of the North Atlantic alliance to include Turkey and Greece. That, unless we are badly mistaken, will be the reaction in suspicious Asia.

No, the Asiatics will not like it, and they would be less than human if they were not to get a kick out of the ponderous Gromyko as he gets up to object to the rules of procedure.

Nor do the Asians like the treaty itself. They have a variety of reactions which are well known prior to the foregathering at the Golden Gate.

No Substitute for Reparations

Most of them want to collect sizable reparations. Wherever the Japanese Army dug in, wherever fighting took place, there was devastation. It is idle to explain, as Mr. Dulles has patiently done, that Uncle Sam began to pick up the bill immediately after the hostilities ended. It is equally idle to point out that foreign aid has become so imbedded in our policy that there is talk of a new Cabinet department to be set up for foreign aid. In spite of all this, the impression created by past and present largesse—most of which, by the way, went not to reconstruction, but down the rathole—has merely added to anti-American feeling in Asia. It certainly is not regarded as a substitute for reparations.

The Japanese, their fellow-Asiatics feel, ought to pay. To suit them the reparations article in the draft treaty has been clarified beyond the original wording as a pledge of Japanese deliveries in kind. Method and division are not spelled out. It will be up to the claimants to make their own bilateral arrangements. The claimants feel that this is inadequate assurance. And in all likelihood they will reiterate great expectations in some passionate speechmaking. But, if history is any guide—from the Franco-German War of 1870 to the partial application of the deliveries-in-kind system after the First World War—Japan will oblige. For deliveries in kind would give a boost to its own economy while it is performing some reconstruction work.

From the West there is bound to be some subterranean support for this Asiatic position, particularly from the French, who have their Indo-Chinese

partners to consider. But in general the delegates of the West may be relied upon to show no dissidence in public. They will grumble in the corridors—first at having to turn up at all, then over the substance of the treaty as Gromyko reminds them of its inadequacies.

Where will a free Japan stand toward these discontents? By, we dare say, our side. Japan is delighted (at present) with a treaty that it couldn't have dreamed of twelve months ago. When Premier Yoshida says that present-day Japan is "definitely and irrevocably on the side of the free world," no doubt he speaks for the Japanese of today. Japan respects power. The prime insurance that Japan will stay in our camp is our determination to remain the paramount power in the Pacific.

As time goes on, moreover, Japan can hope to improve its treaty position in respect to the separated territories only with American benevolence.

However, Japan must live. She hasn't the means to indulge in Kemism and a foreign policy based upon what-might-have-been or upon the heart's desire. We can keep Japan on our side not alone by the perpetuation of our power, but we can prevent any clashing interests from developing only by the evolution of a Far Eastern policy that is realistic. The Japanese must have trade with China. Japan's prewar trade with China represented twenty-five per cent of its total trade. With the United States, thanks to technological change, no longer interested in Japan's silk, there will be the greater need on Japan's part to cultivate the China (and Southeast Asia) market. Thus, if a Far Eastern settlement is too long delayed, we shall find Japan drifting away from our orbit. This is a note of warning not to the Executive Branch, which has forfeited control of policy in the Pacific, but to Congress, which is taking over the reins of diplomacy there.

The Biggest Botch

The treaty, in sum, is a good start in promoting a Japanese-American link in the power politics of Asia, but the start is jeopardized at the outset by the formal ceremony at San Francisco. That ceremony is the biggest botch we have made in the strategy of the cold war. It is illogical to wind up a diplomatic negotiation of this sort with the appearance of a *Diktat*. If the treaty as drafted had been deposited in Tokyo, and the United States and Japan had signed it as a starter through diplomatic channels, the instrument would have collected a sizable number of signatures. The fuss and feathers are gratuitous. They represent a gift to Russian propaganda and a divisive influence in Asia. It is a great pity that a setting of such dangerous import had to be created for a mere formality.

Japan's Price for Peace

The victors prepare to sign a 'treaty of reconciliation,' while the vanquished look around for more concessions

ROMNEY WHEELER



Japan's national game is a genteel pastime called Go.

It looks easy. All you have to do is move button-sized markers across a board until you get five in a row. But it requires skill, foresight, and tenacity. Go is more difficult than chess.

Few Occidentals have learned the game, although the Allied powers have occupied Japan for six years. This is a pity, because in a very real sense Japan is staking its national life on a very similar diplomatic game.

In Go, the aim is to keep your opponent off balance. That has been exactly the aim of Japan's farsighted and tenacious leaders in preparing for a peace treaty.

The key figure has been a suave, shrewd, autocratic old diplomat, Shigeru Yoshida, who first became Prime Minister in 1946. Some Japanese say that Yoshida is like Winston Churchill—at least, as nearly as any Japanese can be. But where Churchill leads to his opponents, Yoshida excels at playing to his opponent's lead—a talent hardly to be underestimated.

Moreover, Yoshida excels in letting others do his talking for him. This was demonstrated when John Foster Dulles came to Tokyo last January on a "fact-finding" mission.

On the day Dulles began his exploratory talks, the political party known as the Ryokufakai (Green Breeze Society) issued a nationalistic manifesto. It demanded:

1. Return of the Kuriles, Okinawa, and the Bonin Islands to Japan.
2. A ten-year limit on any lease of military bases by the United States in Okinawa or Japan.

3. Cancellation of all reparations claims against Japan.

4. Acceptance of Japanese rights to emigrate.

It is doubtful that Yoshida mentioned these matters to Dulles. But as the voice of the Ryokufakai spoke the thoughts of most Japanese—including Yoshida—the result was nearly the same.

Diplomatic Game

Shortly afterward, the Ryokufakai made another and even more notable pronouncement.

"Japan," said a spokesman, "will refuse to be bound by the secret Yalta agreement, of which she had no knowledge and which she will refuse to recognize."

As the Ryokufakai functions with the majority political party of the Japanese Diet, this comment should not be ignored. In effect, it is notice that this powerful political group will press not only for the eventual return of Japan's lesser islands but ultimately of Formosa, which was returned to China at Yalta.

True, the draft treaty stipulates that Japan renounce all claim to Formosa. It is no secret that the people of Formosa—given their choice—would vote first for complete independence, or

alternatively for return to Japan. Moreover, the Japanese are aware that the United States today would be far happier if Formosa were comfortably controlled by Japan rather than in imminent danger of conquest by Communist China.

In the exacting game of diplomacy, Shigeru Yoshida is nearly as wily as a Mississippi River gambler. He has long been aware of Japan's formidable position for diplomatic bargaining, not only before the peace treaty but afterward.

It may be taken with the utmost certainty that Yoshida will avail himself of these circumstances. In short, Japan will put a price upon peace and good will toward men, especially upon Japanese good will toward the West.

It is noteworthy that Japan's leaders have displayed no eagerness for an alliance. In 1949, when the first suggestions that Japan might rearm were made, the Prime Minister commented blandly in the Diet that Japan had renounced war and had written the renunciation into its national constitution. He conveniently ignored the fact that this had been required by General MacArthur. In poker-faced dignity he went on to argue that Japan should be proud of being unarmed; it would thus be insured against involvement in any future war. However, said Mr. Yoshida, this didn't mean that Japan had given up the right to defend itself. For instance, he suggested slyly, it might defend itself through diplomacy.

Jiro Shirazo, one of the closest advisers to the Prime Minister, put the case more bluntly to an American correspondent: "Sentimentally, we would prefer to be on the side of America. But we are not sentimental schoolgirls. We must be realistic. We must see which side our bread is buttered on."





These comments were made late in 1949 and early in 1950, months before events in Korea were to dramatize the urgency of a western alliance with Japan. Yet it cannot be doubted that Yoshida and his associates foresaw clearly that the tide of Communism would run higher in Asia, foresaw too that the friendship of Japan would become a highly marketable commodity.

But price is determined by relative scarcity in time of desperate need. Leading Japanese of all parties were at pains to remind the West, and especially the United States, that they must be wooed if they were to be won. They also made it abundantly clear that they were cool toward any peace treaty that would leave them still technically at war with their Asian neighbors, Soviet Russia and China.

For example, the Japan Joint Foreign Policy Council—composed of leading educators and political figures—declared in 1950 its opposition to any negotiations excluding Russia. It also opposed any deal for post-treaty military bases. The Socialist Party took a similar line, as did most of the big trade unions, and even Yoshida found it expedient to play down the idea of allowing foreign (i.e., American) troops to be stationed in Japan.

Meanwhile, war in Korea brought two interesting developments which, although tending to contradict one another,



other, combined to inflate the price of Japan's postwar friendship.

The first was the growing demand in Washington that Japan be freed from disarmament restrictions and given military means of defending itself.

The second was the discovery—surprising to many—that the average Japanese had no stomach for more war and was totally indifferent to the need for rearmament.

Dulles, noting this evidence of grassroots anti-militarism, realized that it meant, in a very practical sense, that Japan would have to be cajoled into co-operation.

'We Can Be Had'

The West's pressing need for bringing Japan into an alliance against Soviet Russia and Red China was not overlooked in Tokyo. When Dulles pointed out that there could be no definite collective-security system for Japan without Japan's own continuous self-help and co-operation, Yoshida replied easily:

"We realize fully our responsibilities to defend our own land and to do what we can in this respect. When we recover our independence and join the council of free nations as a free member, the circumstances and scope of Japanese contribution will be determined according to the extent of our industrial and economic recovery."

If that sounds like diplomatic doubletalk, it may be helpful to recall Yoshida's preference for letting others do his talking for him. Perhaps by coincidence, on the day before Dulles arrived in Tokyo, Japan's three leading economic and industrial organizations had issued a joint pronouncement:

1. Japan should have its security guaranteed by the United Nations or by the United States (although it might endeavor to defend itself if requested).

2. However, if Japan rearmed, it

would have to receive a guarantee that United Nations forces would in no circumstances abandon it.

3. In any event, Japan could not rearm unless the United States provided most of the money and equipment. Moreover, such assistance would have to continue until Japan attained economic independence.

4. The peace treaty must restore complete sovereignty to Japan.

5. There must be no limitations on Japan's industries, and foreign credits would have to be provided to aid its economy.

6. Japanese must be left free to emigrate.

Again, Sovereignty

There are many points which Japan might be willing to negotiate on, to recede from, or even—in the end—abandon. But there is one point on which we must expect obdurate insistence. That is the restoration of unqualified internal and external independence.

For six years, Japan has submitted to an Allied occupation that controlled and refashioned almost every aspect of its way of life. Although some of these controls have been relaxed in the last two years, the Japanese have chafed more and more at Allied "advice."

Ever since a peace treaty became a matter of discussion, the Japanese have been saying quite bluntly that they will tolerate no post-treaty interference in Japanese domestic affairs. By this they mean that Japan wants a free hand in deciding which aspects of Allied "democratization" it will keep and which it will discard.

At the same time, they have been equally blunt in demanding post-treaty freedom in Japan's external affairs. This is not surprising, because trade is literally a matter of life and death for Japan after the occupation ends.

Throughout the occupation, Japan has been told what nations it can buy from and sell to, and precisely what those purchases or sales might be. When America decided to cut off trade with Red China and Soviet Russia, the stop order applied equally to Japan's trade. Japan was not consulted. Yet China and the Russian Far East were Japan's historic and logical markets, the sources of its most-needed raw materials, and the buyers of its principal exports.

This is not to quarrel with Ameri-

can wisdom in imposing these restrictions. It is true that Japan's trade deficit was made up, year after year, by vast sums in American aid—amounting in the end to more than \$2 billion. However, it is clear that the United States cannot go on subsidizing Japan so lavishly, and American financial experts have told Japan that soon it must stand on its own feet.

In these circumstances, it is hard to see how Japan could have taken any other course than to reject limitation of its freedom to make political and commercial arrangements with its Asian neighbors. This will be a bitter pill for the United States and the other western Allies. Yet unless they wish to drive Japan into the arms of Communism, they have small choice but to accede.

The *Oriental Economist*, published in Tokyo, summed up Japan's view recently in these words: "In the threatening international crisis, Japan is taking part in the free and democratic camp. It is entirely incomprehensible that Japan, one of the democracies, should be subjected to restrictions which are likely to frustrate her efforts towards independence and self-sufficiency."

The Question of Bases

As to rearmament, Japan most likely will let the Allies set the price—simply by being indifferent. Yoshida knows the West cannot afford to let Japan fall into the Communist orbit. Further, he knows that the United States, at least, desires a reasonably rearmament Japan. In view of this, Japan's co-operation is not likely to be cheap. On the contrary, as we have seen, it will undoubtedly expect the United States to provide most of the arms and much of the money for putting its military establishment in business again.

The immediate solution—and the one favored by Dulles and his associates—is a post-treaty agreement by which U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force units would be granted military bases in the home islands of Japan. Dulles reported after his talks in Tokyo last spring that the Japanese Government and a majority of the Japanese people favored protection of unarmed Japan by stationing American forces "in and about Japan."

There is reason to doubt, however, that there was a complete meeting of

minds between the Japanese and President Truman's special envoy. A survey by the Japanese newspaper *Mainichi* in November, 1950, showed only one-fifth of the people in favor of depending on the United States, while nearly half were for permanent neutrality. In the spring of 1951, Japan's three major political parties adopted peace-treaty demands that clearly withheld approval of foreign military bases in Japan.

Yoshida himself is on record as having told the Diet that he did not want to offer any military bases to a foreign power—although Japan, in the end, might be compelled to do so.

It must be clear, then, that if Japan agrees to U.S. military bases, it will be under duress or under conditions which later can be claimed as duress. In any event, we may be certain that Japan will make every effort to insist that U.S. forces be stationed on outlying islands like Okinawa, and that they be permitted to stay for a limited period, probably not more than ten years.

Dulles and Versailles

Unquestionably the architect of the proposed San Francisco treaty is John Foster Dulles. He is a sincere and able individual. In my conversations with him I have found him a steadfast believer in the fundamental honesty of man. He also is motivated by something more: an almost morbid fear of repeating the errors of Versailles.

Dulles is one of the few men now active in diplomacy who were present when the Allies handed their treaty to Germany after the First World War. His recollection of that unfortunate episode fired his determination that the Japanese settlement should be, as he

puts it, "a treaty of reconciliation." He has worked diligently to sell that idea to the Allies—particularly to Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. While they may not wholly share his fervor, they certainly appreciate his fears.

The Unsaid

Thus the treaty to be signed at San Francisco is important on two counts: It is important for what it says, and it is even more important for what it leaves unsaid.

This is worth bearing in mind because, in the end, it is our treaty. We established the main outlines, and while we have tried to make adjustments to the views of the Allies, our own have generally prevailed.

For example, the most notable omission is any reference to future Japanese military power. There is no limitation, expressed or implied, on re-establishment of Japan's Army or Navy, or their air components. Dulles calls it "the modern and enlightened way to deal with the problem."

This may be so. The Versailles restrictions failed, and treaty limitations on Italy's rearmament already are embarrassing. On the other hand, it hardly reassures our Pacific Allies, whose fear is the military resurgence of Japan.

We may reply that the new Pacific Security Agreement takes care of all that. The pact does, indeed, guarantee U.S. military aid to Australia and New Zealand in the event of aggression from any quarter. However, it is significant that, unlike the North Atlantic alliance, this agreement was not prompted by fear of Russia, or of Communism, but by a fear of eventual aggression by Japan.

There are other noteworthy omis-



sions from the treaty draft. There is no restriction, for example, on future Japanese emigration. To Australia, New Zealand, and the other South-west Pacific peoples, this is almost as demoralizing as the matter of rearmament. With 83.5 million people jammed into an area smaller than California, and with a population increasing at the rate of four thousand a day, Japanese emigration is inevitable—the most likely places being New Guinea and Celebes.

Reforms and Reparations

Another omission sure to cause misgivings among the Allies is that involving occupation reforms. It was the proud boast of General MacArthur's headquarters that in little more than five years the entire fabric of Japanese life had been changed. But the Japanese have given unmistakable hints that this is far from true.


The thorniest question of all involves reparations. The draft treaty waives all reparations claims except that Japan may provide restitution to some extent "by making available the skills and industry of the Japanese people in manufacturing, salvaging and other services." The gimmick here is that "Such arrangements shall avoid the imposition of additional liabilities on other Allied Powers [e.g., the United States], and, where manufacturing of raw materials is called for, they shall be supplied by the Allied Power in question, so as not to throw any foreign exchange burden upon Japan."

The whole question of a lenient peace treaty has aroused passionate controversy in countries that were occupied by the Japanese. None has reacted more violently than the Philippines. In Manila Dulles's position on reparations has been resented bitterly. The Filipinos feel that they speak for all smaller nations who suffered under an arrogant Japan—and they are saying that substantial reparations and a limitation of arms are the only guarantee that Japan won't give a repeat performance.

'Manifest Destiny'

To understand the intentions of Japan's leaders, to try to forecast their future actions, we should bear in mind certain fundamental facts.

First, we should remember that Japan was a great and powerful nation



in the past and is remorselessly intent on regaining that power. Before its defeat, it dominated East Asia economically and politically. Nothing that has happened—not even defeat in total war—has dimmed its conviction that it is destined to lead Asia again.

Second, we should realize that San Francisco is only a way station in Yoshida's diplomatic game of Go. The San Francisco treaty, whatever its final form, will establish ground rules for renewed pressure. As we have seen, Japan's basic strategy is to exploit its advantage: to play hard to get when the West—and particularly the United States—is under compulsion to hold Japan as an ally.

Even before the treaty draft was prepared, Yoshida had won substantial concessions from his conquerors. Some war criminals had been paroled. Many leading ex-militarists who had been purged from public life were restored to power. Reparations claims had long since been suspended, and the break-up of Zaibatsu monopolies vastly modified. Japan had been granted the right to resume economic relations and partial diplomatic relations with other nations, and to send its merchant ships out on the high seas. The occupation authorities had worked tirelessly to rebuild Japan's industries and regain the overseas markets lost during the war.

Thus we find that before the Japanese delegates take pen in hand at San Francisco they will have a substantial down payment on Japan's price for peace. Unless the treaty draft is drastically amended, Japan will:

Regain complete internal and external sovereignty, including the right to discard occupation reforms.

Have the right to rearm when and if it chooses—most likely with the United States footing a large part of the bill.

Have the right to deal with Commu-

nist Asia, commercially or politically.

Not have any prohibition on the emigration of its people.

Not be required to pay reparations in capital goods, and pay in manufactured goods only if the claimant provides the raw materials.

All This—and Future Ambitions

We may ask, not unkindly, what more can Japan expect?

Undoubtedly Japan expects continued economic aid—mostly from America—and liberal foreign credits. Additionally, it will want free access to essential raw materials and commercial equality in world markets.

Undoubtedly Japan also hopes eventually to regain some of its island possessions. The treaty stipulates that it will concur with any U.S. proposal to put the Ryukyus, the Bonins, and the Volcano Islands (including Okinawa and Iwo Jima) under United Nations trusteeship, with the United States as sole administering authority. However, the Japanese are comfortably aware that treaties may be changed, and that there is nothing to prevent the return of these islands after a suitable length of time.

Formosa: The Waiting Game

As to Formosa, that is a bigger question which can afford to wait. Japan renounces Formosa. But here too, Japan is not without hope that time and events may make other arrangements expedient.

The Japanese speak hopefully, even confidently, of being admitted to the United Nations, and of assuming their rightful responsibilities as a free and independent member of the international community. Yet in a practical sense they are well aware that Soviet Russia would instantly veto Japan's bid for membership.

It is possible that the United Nations General Assembly might guarantee Japan's future independence. But at best such a guarantee would be a moral gesture, with little but Anglo-American determination to back it up. It follows that Japan must rely on its own efforts, and on some sort of mutual defense arrangement with the United States and perhaps with members of the British Commonwealth. Discussions of such an arrangement, and of Japan's contribution to it, will provide a good basis for future bargaining.

U. S. Science and Modern War

Korea has shown that the services have tended to stick to their old practice of improving on obsolete weapons

R. E. LAPP

The views expressed in the following article are based upon the author's experience as head of Nuclear Physics in the Office of Naval Research, as scientific advisor to the War Department General Staff, as a deputy director in the Joint Research and Development Board, and as executive director of the RDB's committee on atomic energy.

AMERICAN industry is now completing its first year of mobilization for defense. American science has not even been alerted to the emergency. This means that as far as weapons development is concerned we have put the cart before the horse; the scientific invention and evolution of a new weapon must precede its mass production by two, three, or even five years.

During the past six years, since the end of the Second World War, the task of perfecting modern weapons has been directly under military control in arsenals, proving grounds, and laboratories. Superficially, these mammoth installations possess everything—every conceivable physical facility, a surfeit of gleaming apparatus, plenty of money, and thousands of employees. The only missing ingredient is the spark of brilliance which creates new ideas. The men with that spark, the nation's top scientific brains, are not in government laboratories; the great majority are on the campus.

Scientists know what science contributed in the last war. They await the call. But the call has not come.

Napoleon the Eternal

Without the nation's scientific brain power, weapons development since the war has followed conservative patterns, ignoring the bold (but criticizable) approach in favor of timid improvement of existing weapons. The

Ordnance Department of the Army, for example, has devoted almost all of its research-and-development effort to ten per cent improvements of Second World War weapons. Despite the lessons of the last war, when new developments such as rockets had to be forced on it, the Ordnance Department has trundled along, its generals happy with familiar jobs.

One Ordnance general recently tried to justify this approach to the House Armed Services Committee: "While it is true that our research and development does strive to make advances of a whole new order," he said, "in the cold light of logic we must realize that our actual aims and purposes are set at a much more humble and also more practical level." No wonder the wartime A-bomb project was not entrusted to the Ordnance Department: Napoleon, the great artilleryman, is still its guiding light.

Committee Warfare

After the war, scientists feared that military research and development would revert to where they found it in 1942. Dr. Vannevar Bush, wartime chief of scientific weapons development, knew that, left to their own devices, the services would soon forget all but piddling modifications of obsolescent equipment. He said that some mechanism was needed to inject science into military research, to act as

a watchdog on weapon projects, and to tie together the separate programs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.


A year before the Unification Act (the National Security Act of 1947) established the Research and Development Board, Dr. Bush persuaded the Secretaries of War and the Navy to set up an interim agency. When the RDB got started, it already had a rudimentary structure.

The vital part of the board was its dozen or so committees, each looking after a special field, such as guided missiles, atomic energy, or electronics. These committees plowed through the thousands of Army, Navy, and Air Force development projects to reduce and unify them into "a complete and integrated program" as stipulated by law. Duplication and even triplication were not uncommon. The board was then called upon to settle differences between the services. This often meant lifting a project from one agency and assigning it to another, but the new board soon found that to be practically impossible. Military representatives proved that, in time of peace, generals do their fighting in committee.

Board vs. Generals

As more and more board matters were frozen in committee or log-jammed at a higher level, it became evident that the chairman would have to perform a hatchet job on the military program. Some branches of the military were eating up big chunks of research and development funds with trivial results. The Air Force was a bad offender.

Created as an independent service by the Unification Act, the Air Force had only a token legacy in research and development and was virtually without research facilities or personnel. Yet it aggressively cornered many big proj-





ects. To implement the research, the Air Force has worked through Wright Field, Dayton, which has farmed out projects to industrial contractors.

This procedure might very well be satisfactory except that many of the contractors are airframe manufacturers with no competence in advanced electronics and missile guidance. To make matters worse, when RDB criticizes a particular project, the Air Force concentrates on it more strenuously than ever. The NEPA (Nuclear Energy for the Propulsion of Aircraft) Project was a case in point. Advised by RDB "that the project should be terminated promptly," the Air Force fought to expand it. For a while, the Air Force managed to outwit the board, but eventually the project was terminated and the work assigned to a different contractor.

Although the RDB ax does hack away at wasteful contracts, real integration of service research and development is still nowhere in sight. The board has met with some success in co-ordinating the various projects of the Armed Forces and in acquainting the Army, Navy, and Air Force with each other's work. But RDB has been unable

to budge the services from their habit of evolving new weapons by making slight changes in old ones. Here RDB has only been able to chip gradually away at the old-fashioned methods of the military.

If there were time, this sort of erosion might be tolerable. But there may not be. And there certainly wasn't in Korea.

What Korea Revealed

Korea forced the armed services to show their hand on new weapons. One might contend that since Korea is not an all-out war, our Military Establishment has held back weapons from the field. However, the threatened collapse of the Pusan perimeter defense a year ago was a military emergency of the first order, and everything we had was thrown into battle. Everything, that is, except such special weapons as the A-bomb.

Korea has shown that the postwar years have produced almost nothing new or revolutionary which could be used on the battlefield. Soldiers in Korea have been equipped with Second World War weapons, sometimes slightly modified. In some cases, such as the proximity-fuzed weapons, we have been hard put to get even these into operation. "Superweapons" have been conspicuous by their absence.

It is not fair simply to blame RDB. The development of a weapon is only one step in the long process of getting it to the battlefield in quantity. To bridge the gap from research to battlefield use is not really RDB's responsibility. It does no research itself, being a high-level overseer far removed from the laboratory. The area between the birth and field use of a weapon is a kind of limbo outside the purview of any specific agency. Even if, for example, the Army Ground Forces likes the look of a new recoilless rifle, there is a considerable time required to iron out all the wrinkles in the device and to engineer it for mass production.

Nonetheless, RDB is responsible for monitoring our whole weapons program. It must therefore be held accountable for the present mediocrity of our research and development effort. Back in 1947 and 1948 when the weapons we do not have today should have been evolving from the dream stage, the board was stalemated in its functions. A whole complex of underlying

causes can be advanced to explain the impasse, but one may perhaps understand why RDB did *not* work by understanding how OSRD *did* work during the last war.

OSRD stands for the Office of Scientific Research and Development. It was created by President Roosevelt as an independent civilian body to turn new ideas into practical weapons in the shortest possible time. It is most significant that OSRD, unlike RDB, was not under the military fist; it operated as a free agent, often fighting Pentagon obstinacy. OSRD, like RDB, had its committees, but with several major differences.

First, the committees were civilian. No military representatives could road-block committee action.

Second, the committee members often served full time rather than coming to Washington for one day a month.

Third, each group had direct liaison and authority with respect to the research projects; for these were OSRD projects, whereas RDB has had and has no projects to call its own.

Finally, the OSRD committees were backed up by a strong secretariat which was intimately aware of the research projects. RDB, on the other hand, has had and has a flabby technical staff, and even this includes a large military contingent. To top matters off, RDB has become infested with a score of bureaucratic administrators whose delight seems to be in amassing red tape.

Again, Ordnance

Apart from the inherently difficult matter of unifying research and development policy, by far the highest hurdle for RDB has been the services' reluctance to accept new ideas and forsake their time-honored methods of doing business. The Ordnance Department, traditionally suspected of clinging to Napoleon's coattails, has been perhaps the most egregious example.

When RDB first proposed that it es-



establish a committee on ordnance, General Everett S. Hughes descended upon Vannevar Bush in violent protest against this invasion of the sacred precinct of Army Ordnance. During the war, scientists found it almost impossible to get the Aberdeen Proving Grounds to try out anything new. The writer does not profess to be an ordnance expert, and he knows how smugly the Ordnance Department dismisses its critics: "What do you know about ordnance? We have men who have spent their lives in this field." But one does not have to be an expert to ferret out the faults of this citadel of conservatism.

Time and again, Army Ordnance has started two steps behind the enemy on a given weapon and has tried to catch up by improving an already obsolescent weapon. In tank development, for example, this country has a tradition of mediocrity. At no time in the last war were we able to produce a tank as good as the current German model, so that finally our tank commanders fought their battles by sheer weight of numbers, realizing that a tank-to-tank fight was suicide.

When it comes to stopping tanks, Army Ordnance has always been ready to knock out the enemy's outmoded tanks but never his current model. In Korea, for example, the Russian T-34 with its low silhouette and heavy armor should have been no surprise to our Army, for the tank is of Second World War vintage. But when it came to stopping this tank, the Ordnance Department had to rush through emergency orders for suitable anti-tank weapons.

Air and Air-Defense

Our Air Force's development program may be damned with faint praise: It is better than that of Army Ordnance. As already mentioned, the Air Force contracts for its research work and depends upon the resources of private industry. When it wants a new plane, it issues tentative specifications to the aircraft industry and



invites the development of the plane on a competitive basis. However, industry's main forte has been its ability to mass-produce rather than to come up with startling new developments. It is no secret that our jet-engine research was three years or more behind the Nazi effort.

The world's first jet fighter to enter combat was the Me-262, a creation of Willy Messerschmitt. This interceptor was designed in 1939 and test-flown in 1942, but, fortunately for us, was not produced and committed to combat until the closing days of the war. Had Germany pushed its jet production earlier, it is generally conceded that our Flying Fortresses would have been grounded in England.

Despite the fact that the Soviets acquired the lion's share of the Nazi air developments and corralled most of the top German air experts, it came as a surprise to Americans that the Soviets could produce the Mig-15 and other better jet aircraft. However, an even greater surprise may be in the offing. What is not generally realized is that when the Soviets took over Nazi jet developments, they also scooped up the German work on air-defense missiles. As of 1945, three of these anti-aircraft rockets were well along in operational tests. To gain some insight

into what these weapons were to do, the official specifications laid down by the Luftwaffe may be quoted: "The AA rocket must be able to meet and destroy with a certainty, at a distance of thirty-one miles, enemy raiders flying at an altitude of 65,000 feet and at a speed of 485 miles per hour."


One of the three developed AA rockets was the *Wasserfall*, a missile resembling the V-2 but much smaller. Some three hundred of these weapons had been constructed, and forty were actually flight-tested, before V-E Day. The Soviets took over the *Wasserfall*, lock, stock, and barrel. The *Wasserfall* itself had deficiencies, but the Soviets and their German collaborators have had over six years to improve the missile. Furthermore, our constant propaganda about an A-blitz against the U.S.S.R. must be regarded as extreme motivation for the Kremlin to develop sure-fire killer missiles.

Clumsy Muzhiks

We continue to underestimate Soviet achievements and to overestimate our own. We have made serious errors in our judgment of Soviet atomic and aircraft capabilities. For some curious reason, even highly placed officials in our government seem obsessed by the notion that Soviet science cannot compare with ours. Perhaps they feel that Soviet research laboratories are manned by clumsy muzhiks incapable of dealing with the intricacies of electronics, mathematics, and physics.

Whenever we are rudely shocked by such developments as the Soviet A-bomb and the Mig-15, instead of acknowledging the achievement, we say: "The Soviets stole our A-bomb secrets," or "They copied the Mig-15 from the Germans." What we must realize is that it takes a highly advanced science and technology, not to mention a capable industry, to make even Chinese copies of complex weapons. The purloining of A-bomb secrets certainly helped the Soviets but it did not give them the A-bomb.

For years, we have been resting upon dubious laurels and serious misconceptions. As a result our weapons progress is today far from what it should be. Within the Military Establishment the Research and Development Board has not lived up to its responsibilities. It has condoned, or at least has been unable to change, the mediocrity of our



weapons development. Unification of the Armed Forces in the case of weapons development has not been in evidence; one might whimsically say that the only unification here has been that of the services in opposing the moves of RDB.

Merely to sound a scientific four-alarm and mobilize the nation's top scientists does not solve the problem. It is a first step, but it will be a short one unless science is given a free hand, as

it was during the last war. In fact, it would be desirable to establish a new Office of Scientific Research and Development. Working outside the Military Establishment, this new agency could revitalize our sluggish weapons research. It could exploit the full potential of the universities and institutions which developed the A-bomb, the proximity fuze, and the radar of the Second World War.

American science has the capacity

to outrank the rest of the world in weapon perfection. Only a fraction of this ability has been put to work. To provide our fighting men with the best in weapons, the battle of the laboratories must be joined now.

This battle—the battle of ideas—must be won first. As Dr. Alan T. Waterman, Director of the National Science Foundation, has stated: "Ideas alone can give us the margin of superiority in technological warfare. . . ."

Transatlantic Tension

An American observer finds that European resentment is an inevitable by-product of our sudden rise to world power

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

MY TRAVELING companions, returning from Europe, were deeply disturbed. Some were ordinary tourists who had expected Europeans to welcome Americans with marks of gratitude for the generosity of our statesmanship. They found ill-concealed hostility instead. Some were American students returning from study abroad, particularly in France. They were baffled by the alternations between crypto-Communism and neutralism in the intellectual life of France.

The experiences of these travelers must be regarded as typical of the hazards which American-European relations will encounter, probably for decades to come.

Anti-Americanism is a kind of sub-

terranean stream in the life of Europe. Upon the surface there is satisfaction in the healthful effects of the Marshall Plan upon the European economy, a new sense of security arising from the gradual integration of a European army, and less hysteria about the inevitability of war than in America.



Helpful Hearing

The usual criticisms by Europeans of our lack of poise have been largely dispelled by the Senate hearings on MacArthur. Europe, like Asia, had regarded MacArthur as a symbol of American irresponsibility. Most Europeans were convinced that he was wrong in crossing the 38th parallel and that the entrance of China into the struggle was the consequence of this indiscretion. The salutary effect of the Senate hearings was due to the fact that they revealed a responsible American statesmanship, of which MacArthur was not the symbol, and one which planned policy with much greater circumspection than Europeans had assumed.

Furthermore, the fact that the hear-

ings were held at all gave Europeans an impressive demonstration of the solidity of our democratic institutions. It was, many assured me, a luxury in which only the strong could indulge. This observation comes from the continent, for obviously Britain, whatever its trials, has an organic sense of community beyond all party conflict which certainly equals and probably exceeds our own.

Superficially, much progress has been made in integrating the so-called Atlantic community. But the progress is in the sphere of military and economic organization. In the realm of political, moral, and cultural opinion a deep animus against America, and a consequent "neutralism," persist.



Perhaps the most obvious cause is the fact that rearmament threatens living standards to a greater degree than Americans can realize. The issue of guns or butter is a real one. The most responsible people in Europe know that the hard necessities of the international situation, rather than American impatience, are responsible for the defense program. That is why, for instance, "Nyc" Bevan did not make great inroads into the Labour Party with his anti-American rebellion and his rather cheap policy pamphlet in which he championed butter (or rather dentures) against guns but failed to implement his policy with specific proposals. Nevertheless there is an undercurrent of opinion in the Labour Party that after all Bevan may be right. That opinion is shared on the continent. It is widely shared because the armaments program has accelerated inflation.


Europe's Capitalists and Workers

We might well argue that we are not responsible for the social effects of rearmament. In large part they are due to the European bourgeoisie's remarkable callousness about the effects of inflation upon industrial workers. Wage rates are increased so tardily that they never catch up with the inflationary spiral. European prosperity has undoubtedly been bought at the expense of the workers; and this is as true of Germany as it is of France. It is no accident that twenty-six per cent of the population still votes Communist in France. That vote represents resentment and despair. America is regarded by the workers of Europe, even by non-Communist workers, as the symbol of this injustice.

This judgment is highly ironic; for our American capitalists, compared with the European bourgeoisie, are beacons of enlightenment. They will pay high wages if they can maintain high profits, and they are concerned with industrial efficiency with a passion unknown in Europe, or at least in France. French workers would be astounded if they understood the implications of the "escalator" clauses of our labor contracts. They would be even more astounded if they could see that the American lower middle classes are more imperiled by inflation than are American industrial workers, who have the organized power to ride

the inflationary spiral. The whole of Europe has little understanding, moreover, of the greater fluidity of our class structure. Marxism in its various versions is still a living creed in Europe because it achieves most relevance where the class structure of an ancient feudalism is wedded to the dynamics of a technical society. The social realities of a nation like our own are something of a mystery from the perspective of Europe.

Yet the working-class resentments



against us are not all derived from a natural inclination to see our social structure in terms analogous to their own. European workers listen to our constant propaganda about "free enterprise" and suspect that we are responsible for forcing social policies upon them which perhaps are acceptable in a situation of American abundance but certainly catastrophic in a situation of scarcity.

Whatever may be the defects of the British "austerity" program, the contrast between the precise sense of justice in Britain, the high level of general well-being, compared with the outrageous contrasts of luxury and penury in Germany, France, and Italy should give our apostles of classical economics pause. It may well be that Britain has more social health than continental nations because it has the spiritual power to defy the drift toward a too unregulated freedom in

economic life which characterizes continental economies and which is partly prompted by the prestige of the American economy. Occasionally, as perhaps in Germany, American policy, as well as prestige, may contribute to the development.

Marxist Dogmatism

On the other hand, anti-American feeling is due frequently not to inevitable misunderstandings about our social realities or to resentments against our actual policies but to rather pathetic Marxist dogmatisms. It is surprising to what extent even non-socialist and anti-Communist Europe has imbibed Marxist dogmatism about the nature of "imperialism" and its relation to "capitalism." If American liberalism is inclined to sentimentality in obscuring the factor of power in world politics and in imagining our nation free of the temptation to misuse power, the Marxist dogma certainly obscures the social realities even more grievously. In Marxist thought we are "by definition" an unjust nation since we are capitalist. Even bitter experience with the cruel imperialism of a Communist nation seems not to have qualified this dogma essentially.

This fact may be symbolic of the general ideological confusion of European parliamentary socialism, which in practice is an important force in holding the "middle ground" of democracy against the forces of reaction on the one hand and Communism on the other. Certainly no element in European life is more consistently and heroically anti-Communist.

Yet ideologically this socialism lives on husks from which Communism has taken the wheat of pure Marxism. European socialism is ideologically weak because it cannot bring itself to realization of the disquieting truth that Communism is not so much a corruption of orthodox Marxism as the inevitable consequence of its most basic presuppositions. To be sure, Marx did not intend the corruptions of power which Communism practices. They nevertheless follow inevitably from all of the various Marxist miscalculations about the relation of power to justice, particularly from the naïve belief that property is the only source both of economic power and of the corruption of self-interest in the use of power. The ideological weakness of

democratic socialism in Europe is one of the various aspects of the moral confusion of European politics.

The Shift of Power

The anti-American animus of Europe, with its concomitant neutralism, is not all derived from considerations of social policy. Some of it is due simply to the tremendous shift of power which has taken place in international relations in the past two decades. Europe is our spiritual father. We were, until recently, the adventurous son who had gone into a far country whence came back rumors that he had found a way of combining riotous living with a success and prosperity quite unlike "the husks that the swine do eat" in the Biblical story of the Prodigal.

This adventurous rather than wayward son now suddenly returns to dominate the destiny of Europe. Momentary gratitude that his power holds back the tide of Communism, and momentary anxiety that he may not have the stability to persevere in this Herculean task, constantly give way to envy of this power and prosperity and resentment at Europe's impotence. Our own experience with isolationism in the days when the lines of power were in Britain's hands should give us some understanding of such neutralism. Impotence tends to generate an attitude of irresponsibility just as power tends to generate a sense of responsibility, though not always a comparable sense of justice. It is significant that these resentments are actually greater in France than in Britain, though they would be more natural in the nation which held the position of hegemony in Europe until we took it over.

An American may be pardoned for



suspecting that French resentments are sometimes an unconscious cover for France's uneasy conscience about its role in recent history. But there are other reasons why France's resentments rise higher than those of Britain. French democracy is insecure. The long delay in forming a Government after the July elections is symptomatic of that weakness. Incidentally, the particular difficulties which prevented the formation of a Government are symbolic of the whole continental situation. For everywhere on the continent Catholicism and socialism are in uneasy alliance in holding the middle ground. And everywhere they have difficulty in liquidating an ancient feud. The school question is the current focal point of that ancient feud. The middle ground is weak in Europe, particularly in France. It is a divided camp held together by sheer fear of the beasts of Gaullism and Communism which threaten to overrun its ramparts. Resentments of our power and security are generated in such insecurities.

The Wavering Intellectuals


French resentments epitomize and exaggerate the resentments of a "cultured" parent civilization against its uncouth son. All over Europe "Americanization" has become synonymous with the threat of "technics" against the organic and traditional elements of culture. Is America not, asks the French journal *Le Monde*, rather repetitiously, a "technocracy" scarcely distinguishable from the Russian variety? The attack at this point is not upon our capitalistic social organization but upon our culture, upon its real and imagined vulgarities. One is tempted to reply resentfully that the French culture is indeed ripe to the point of overripeness, that the French intellectuals oscillate between an absurd devotion to Communist illusions and a sophistication which is bereft of every illusion and ends in the convic-


tion that human existence itself is absurd.

But perhaps these resentful countercharges have no place if one seeks an understanding between America and the continent. Perhaps we ought to admit that a civilization as preoccupied with technics as our own unavoidably exhibits vulgarities which mellow cultures find difficult to bear. The genuine merits of our culture will prove themselves in time. The "moss" of an organic culture does not easily settle on the shining metal of modern machines. There are evidences in American life that the sense of justice and community can come to terms with technical civilization, though the imponderables of culture require time.

Power Is Always Resented

In any event our power would be resented in Europe, even while it is courted, even if it had proceeded from an ancient rather than a modern culture. We shall have to learn to bear these resentments with patience. We must not assume that they are all unjustified; for power never impinges upon weakness without some injustice. Nor are its most creative achievements of statesmanship (the Marshall Plan, for instance) acts of generosity. Generosity is probably beyond the moral capacity of collective man. It is therefore foolish for powerful nations to pretend to it. The pretension will merely elicit cynical reactions. But it is not impossible for nations to find the point of concurrence between self-interest and a wider interest than their own. This we have done in the most creative acts of American statesmanship in recent years. We shall have to be content with the knowledge that this is so, neither claiming more moral credit than we deserve nor becoming too disturbed by the fact that our power and our prosperity will arouse both justified and unjustified resentments—even among friends and allies who are inexorably locked with us in a community of common destiny.





Bloody Harlan and Corrupt Bell

The first of a series of articles on the section that has given Kentucky's hill country much of its reputation for violence

WILLIAM S. FAIRFIELD

IN THE southeastern corner of Kentucky, where the Pine and Cumberland mountain ranges cross, there is a small section known to residents of adjoining regions as "South America." Those who use the title consider the section as isolated and inaccessible as a foreign land.

To an outsider, the entire southeastern corner of the state might easily be thought of in this way. The mountains provide a natural barrier few forces have seen fit to break down in view of the area's always weak and now starving economy. Isolation is the result; but it is far more than mere physical isolation of the inhabitants that startles the visitor. There is something almost foreign in their morals and customs, and

in the primitively corrupt conduct of their government.


The area, following the Cumberland Range eighty miles northeast along the Virginia border, consists primarily of two counties. One is "Bloody Harlan," nationally known for its record of violence ever since the mine-union wars of the 1930's. The other, adjoining Harlan to the south, is Bell, less notorious but equally deserving.

Middlesboro, in lower Bell County, is the largest town in the area, with a population of 14,400. The nearest cities of any size are Lexington, Kentucky, 160 miles to the north, and Knoxville, Tennessee, sixty miles to the south. Knoxville is the closest stop for any airline, the last point for regular train

service. From there, the only satisfactory method of travel is by automobile.

A car allows the driver to start for the area at any hour, but, more vital, it allows him to leave the area at any minute should he or his mission be unwelcome. For in this backwater of American civilization, undesirables are not eliminated by social or business ostracism. They are first threatened, then—if important enough—offered bribes. If neither method succeeds, they are sometimes beaten. Most often they are simply killed.

Before I paid my first visit to the area, I was warned by at least a dozen people that I might be exactly such an undesirable. I went anyway, believing that half-informed people always tend



to exaggerate. After two week-long stays, I'm sure I was right. A reporter has little reason for fear so long as he uses his head, so long as he stays within the bounds of a reporter's job—as defined by his fellow journalists, not by Hollywood.

The Tired Land

From the outside world, only three U.S. highways and three state highways cross the 350-odd-mile perimeter of the Harlan-Bell territory—six narrow, twisting blacktop roads, the arteries serving an area of some 1,200 square miles. Local chambers of commerce, grasping at the straw of tourist trade to replace the rapidly diminishing dollars from the coal mines that once gave the area some economic importance, describe these routes as “scenic.” If all mountain roads are scenic, it follows that these must also be—but only on that condition.

About the only pleasant feature of driving in the area is the lack of advertisements along the roads. Apparently, the manufacturer of only one product considers the mountain folk a potent enough market to merit the erection of full-scale billboards. That product is a patent medicine called Hadacol. Otherwise, about the only roadside posters are those denoting the strong religious leanings of the people: “Jesus Christ Will Be Back,” “Get Right With God. Why Be Foolish Any Longer?,” “Jesus Is Coming Back”—the last irreverently scarred by gunfire.

Even in late May, when the bloom of laurel daubs mountainsides with bright lavender, Harlan and Bell Counties are beautiful only in selected spots.

There is something tattered about the area, something old and worn thin. Rock juts through the skin of earth at every sharp contour. Abandoned coal mines erupt like so many ugly black sores above the roads winding through the valleys. Along the roads, strips of tilled land expose the gray, dissipated soil, with a few dwarfed cornstalks withering here and there in evidence of their futile struggle for nourishment. Even the trees fall short of the thick, vibrant growth of other mountain forests.

Snuggled in the valleys behind the towns are attractive residential districts inhabited by the mine operators, the few successful businessmen, and those who have reached the top through a violent, pistol-governed evolutionary process. But along the roads the homes are rough-hewn boxes, many sagging on their beams and almost all sadly in need of paint. There are few signs of rural electrification, many of the prevalence of outdoor plumbing.

Those Who Wait

In the shade of overhanging roofs, rows of men squat interminably on their heels, staring blankly across the road and waiting for their turn in the coal mines, most of which now operate only one or two days a week. Even after dark, when the rows dissolve, the signs of unemployment are there: Only an occasional man of all those idly wandering the town streets has the black fingernails caused by a day in the mines, or the tight crusts of coal dust around the eyes, like mascara badly applied.

“What they used to call ‘black diamonds’ is just black rocks now, I guess.

People in Middlesboro putting in oil burners and natural gas, and some of them can throw a rock into a mine from their front porch,” one young miner complained to me. He was leaving in a week for Detroit and a defense job.

The older men are the hopeless ones. They can't leave because of their families. They can't find other work because there is no other work—within fifty miles, no other industry except for a handful of small lumber companies and two or three quarries. These men must stay on, they and the womenfolk and the kids.

There are plenty of kids, all of them fair-skinned, as befits their pure Anglo-Saxon lineage. The older boys can be found, even late in the spring, clustered around clumsily constructed outdoor basketball hoops, a reminder of the University of Kentucky's pre-eminence in that sport and the fact that some of its greatest talent has come from Harlan and Bell Counties. Many of the older girls, those over fourteen, are married; but the younger girls and the children are kept busy at home. Modern household conveniences are unknown to mothers for whom a new gingham dress is a luxury.

Words and Honor

Isolation has had its curious effects. One is discernible in the local dialect, a faintly Southern blend but without the agonizing drawl. Visiting professors have pronounced it purer English than that spoken in England today. Isolation, they say, has preserved whole phrases dating from Spenserian and even Chaucerian times. “Poke,” for “pocket,” and “high sheriff” are two examples.

Isolation has also led to an almost incredible amount of inbreeding. The skinny telephone books of Middlesboro and Pineville in Bell County and of the town of Harlan itself contain whole columns, and sometimes pages, of Balls, Middletons, Hensleys, Cawoods, and Howards. Many of the relationships have long since been obscured; men have killed others with the same family name.

These are a simple people, poorly educated but honest and courageous; proud, friendly to strangers; loyal to friends; no more hotheaded than most, but once aroused much more inclined to settle matters with a rifle. Most of

them attend church regularly. The Bible is standard reading. Many don't smoke or drink, and under local option only a few districts, in Bell County, remain "wet" despite openhanded vote buying by the liquor interests.

Their moral code is a simple one, perhaps rudimentary, but it serves them more honestly than the code of the mine owners, the code of the union organizers, or the code of the Baptist preachers. It is a highly personal code, based not on success in the usual American terms but on respect from one's peers. Often the respect is grudging, for often it is hard-earned. But a man's good name and the good name of his family are very important. There is so little else.

A shriveled old man embodies the spirit completely as, ragged and dirty, he repeats defiantly to anyone who will listen, "There ain't a man living that's killed a Woods."

Personal injustice, no matter how indirect, must be repaid. Local courts of law have never been relied upon for retribution, however, as is partly justified by their history of corruption. It is the duty of the individual to avenge himself. If he no longer lives, it is the duty of his brothers or his sons.

The Code

As always when people deal out their own private justice, the punishment often is more severe than the crime. To the man first damaged, an eye is never sufficient payment for an eye, nor a tooth for a tooth. Thus the cycle may begin with the slightest insult and end,

eventually, in one or several killings.

It is a rare month in the area when at least one man is not shot down. The circuit court that served both Harlan and Bell Counties for 129 years, before the Kentucky legislature made Harlan a separate district in 1948, never met without a murder case on its docket; and there were as many as thirty murder trials on a single docket.

Since 1948, Harlan has extended the record, despite an Associated Press report last April 23 that the Harlan circuit court would be greeted with no murder cases for the first time in history when it convened on May 7. Although the AP didn't bother with a follow-up story, it soon learned that its report had literally jumped the gun. Two days later, on the evening of April 25, a onetime bootlegger named Avery Hensley and his stepson Joe were shot and killed in the middle of Harlan's business district. The murders made the court calendar with almost two weeks to spare.

The Caldwells and the Brocks

It is true, however, that killings are not so frequent as they once were. Mine owners no longer hire local toughs by the dozens, as well as gunmen from as far away as Chicago, to kill union men. And the full-scale feud has been pretty much a thing of the past for twenty years. If it hadn't been for the Second World War, feuding might be totally extinct today. But after the war, an old feud was revived, back in the mountains, between the Caldwells and the Brocks. The older boys of both families came back from service with stolen grenades, sub-machine guns, carbines, plenty of ammunition, and even, according to one rumor, dismantled parts of a flame thrower. With its pooled veterans' bonuses, possibly more money than it had ever seen at one time, one family bought jeeps and painted them red. The other family promptly bought jeeps and painted them yellow. For a few months, a small war raged in the mountains—but with all the advanced tactics learned in Europe and in the Pacific. People were destroyed by booby-traps, and homes were burned out. Some say at least ten died, but an accurate count is impossible, since the dead were quietly buried by their kinfolk, without report to the legal authorities.



Aside from the killings, the crime rate in Harlan and Bell is well on the low side of any national average. Robberies are few.

Rape is almost unheard-of in the area. Except for a large number of professional and a few amateur whores, womenfolk occupy far too honored a position to be tampered with. In a primitive way, they are treated even with chivalry; men have killed to revenge insults to wives and sisters, and will again.

One senses throughout the area a certain pride in its violent record. Two hitchhiking mountain boys I picked up along the thirty-five miles of river-bottom road between Pineville and Harlan told me of their friend Zeke, who was "so good with a .38 he could flip a corn bud in the air and hit it every time." They recalled how Zeke had died ("course, they had to shoot him in the back") and went on to tell of other killings of other friends and acquaintances. Instead of a sadness in the telling of these events, however, there was a clear delight, as if the crimes held some reflected glory.

Gory Glory

The pride is most often expressed by a simple question: "Well, how do you like our wild town?"

Even on the various levels of civic responsibility there is, if not pride, at least complacency. Two prominent officials, asked to comment on the frequent killings, both dismissed the subject quickly, as if it really weren't worth discussing:

"Yeah, that's right. We have a lot of them," Circuit Judge R. L. Maddox agreed impassively.

"Well, you know, they're a courageous people, and sometimes they do act a little quick," said U.S. Representative James S. Golden, whose district includes Harlan and Bell Counties.

The same attitude occasionally glimmers in the local press. When the Pineville Sun reported the slaying of Avery





Harlan and his stepson, it used a sub-headline hardly reflecting righteous indignation:

HARLAN RETURNS TO NORMAL
AFTER LONG PERIOD
WITHOUT KILLING

Labor Takes Off the Gloves

As might be expected, the area's sympathy with violent, extra-legal justice has been twisted and brutalized by certain forces to serve their own purposes. Some of the worst abuses in the last several years have been those of members of the local chapters of the United Mine Workers and its affiliates.

"We got a little different kind of picketing down here," a strong union man in Bell County proudly reported. "When we call a strike and some scab violates it, we think it's pretty silly to walk up and down with placards. Much easier to get up on top of a mountain with a high-powered rifle and put a hole in him. Gets better cooperation too."

Some of the union violence has no other reason than resentment. Toward the end of the war years, a mine owner was killed when he decided to drive up and look over one of his mines. The union was on strike at the time, and a few of the more intemperate strikers simply decided the owner had no business snooping around; so they ambushed his car and shot him. More recently, as the miners of one local were walking off their jobs on a strike call, the son of a mine official stopped to throw a tarpaulin over an exposed motor. For this half-conscious act, he was severely beaten on the spot.

Five years ago, a pair of union men walked into the office of mine superintendent Robert Halbert and accused him of not submitting their applications for vacation benefits. Halbert told them, as he had before, that the matter was out of his control, since the mine was being operated by the government at the time. He asked them to quit bothering him. One of the miners pulled a gun and put two slugs into Halbert. A jury gave the killer a twelve-year prison term, and his companion was freed. The convicted man is expected out on parole soon.

These are not isolated examples of union conduct. Three years ago, a UMW affiliate tried to organize the drivers of a bus company serving Bell County. When the situation became tense, the old owners of the company sold out. New drivers were hired, and they steadfastly refused to sign up, even after shots were fired into their tires and across their hoods on deserted mountain runs. Finally, a band of union organizers and men ambushed one bus as it climbed a mountain in low gear. The driver was killed by a burst from a submachine gun. Shotgun pellets were also found in his body. At the grand jury hearings, the only witness, an uninjured passenger, offered no helpful testimony. No one was indicted.

Organized Death

Killing is not always a matter of honor, or even of the savage theory of justice enforced by the unions. Harlan and Bell have their share of predatory beings. And while the local attitude

toward murder and mayhem does encourage the practice of killing for gain, it also represents a code under which only the quickest and the cleverest manage to stay alive. Bootleg wars, slot-machine wars, and wars for absolute control of local government have all taken their toll.

None of the people boast of these wars, or of the killings and lesser crimes committed in their name. There is no pride in such scheming violence—no sense of private justice in watching one racketeer shoot down another; no personal honor in knowing an election has been stolen without protest; not even complacency in refusing to testify to a witnessed crime because of threats. Instead, there is fear—fear and the feeling that stepping into something unrelated to personal honor is not sufficient cause for laying one's life on the line.

Whatever their exact motivations, most killers get off with light punishment from the courts of Harlan and Bell—if, indeed, they are ever brought to trial. In the history of Harlan, only seven men have received death sentences. And it is not unusual for a man who has committed premeditated murder, before witnesses who will testify, to serve his time in prison and be back in his native mountains within five years.

... and Corruption

Corruption in public office has been rampant in the area. In recent history none has been immune, from city policemen up through circuit judges. The unions, the bootleg and slot-machine interests, all of whom want a free hand in dispensing their own private justice, control large blocks of votes. And they use their power at the polls to maximum effect.

Until the state legislature's shake-up of judicial districts in 1948 allowed the governor to appoint Judge Maddox, responsible citizens of Bell County firmly believed there was no such thing as a fair trial by law. Even today, suspicion of court justice runs high in Bell and Harlan. One apparently informed resident of Harlan has even gone so far as to estimate that there have been only a handful of honest officials in the recent history of the county.

Even assuming no faction in a specific legal proceeding is actually "fixed," the killer still has few reasons

to fear a heavy sentence. For the jury of his peers believes, as he does, that murder for the slightest possible "just cause" belongs somewhere in the lower spectrum of crime, and that a prison term is no solution anyway. "It can't do the dead man any good to send the living to jail," says one citizen in explanation of his lenient stand as jury member in a recent trial.

Calendar of Mayhem

The results of all this are perhaps best illustrated by the following excerpts, picked at random, from the Harlan *Enterprise's* two-page "Review of 1949":

"March 15—Case of Evarts Police Officers Combs and Deaton was filed today. They are charged with the fatal shooting of Bryan Middleton.

"March 18—Six eye-witnesses for the prosecution testified Deaton fired the first shot in the December 17 gun battle in which Bryan Middleton was slain.

"March 19—A jury found Isachar Combs and Lewis Deaton guilty of voluntary manslaughter and recommended ten years each in prison. [Deaton and Combs were later retried in another jurisdiction. Both were freed by the jury.]

"March 25—Sam Ella Ross was

found guilty of voluntary manslaughter and given five years in prison.

"March 29—A jury found Brazel Napier guilty of voluntary manslaughter and recommended a sentence of two years and a day."

In unconscious irony, the *Enterprise* commemorated April 15, a few lines below, as follows:

"April 15—The city of Harlan was listed among five Kentucky cities between 5,000 and 10,000 population winning places on the National Safety Council's Honor Roll for not having a single traffic fatality during 1948."

(This is the first of several articles by Mr. Fairfield on Harlan and Bell Counties.)

The Government in Medicine

The present outcry over 'socialism' disregards the fact that the government has been in medicine for over a century

MAX SEHAM, M.D.



OVER THE AIR, in newspapers, magazines, and political speeches, the American people are incessantly warned about government interference with the private practice of medicine.

It is menacing, they are told—incompatible with the "American way of life," the first step toward the "welfare state." The President's program for national health is "Kremlin-inspired," "Socialistic and Communistic," "inciting to revolution."

Is all this true? Would the President's program "enslave the medical profession and cause a deterioration in the quality of medical care"? The American Medical Association, from whose literature these quotations are taken, thinks so.

Many Americans, whatever their motivations, close their eyes to the true reasons for government participation in promoting the health of the people. No Administration, Republican or Democratic, has ever attempted to "enslave the medical profession." Except in war or depression, the government has "encroached" upon private practice only when a local community or a state has been too short of funds, personnel, or enthusiasm to cope with a situation. We Americans have short memories indeed if we have forgotten what happened during the depression. Who can forget the idle factories, the millions of unemployed, and the poverty which produced widespread deficiencies in diet, neglect of teeth, and the postponement of necessary treatment of disease? Without government co-operation, private physicians and voluntary health agencies would have reached an impasse, and the founda-

tions of this country's health might have been destroyed.

Thousands of farmers, unemployed workers, and their families were furnished free medical care out of general taxation. In spite of all dire predictions, when the emergency was over the government withdrew and the status quo was restored.

Partnership

The partnership between government and the medical profession began in 1798, when Congress enacted a law protecting the health of merchant mariners. This first system of compulsory health insurance arose from the provision of the Constitution giving the Congress power "to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to . . . provide for the . . . general Welfare. . . ." It was based upon the principle that the Federal government could provide medical services and



hospitalization, financed by a payroll tax and general taxation, for certain classes of self-supporting citizens.

In the next fifty years the line of demarcation between public and private medicine was sharp. The attitude was: "The business of the public-health officer is to prevent disease; the business of the private physician is to cure it." Public-health agencies—first Federal, then state—limited their activities to quarantine, sanitation, and the prevention of epidemics.

Industrial Medicine

In frontier days, more than two-thirds of the people lived in rural areas. With the Industrial Revolution, tremendous changes took place in the social and economic status of the majority of the citizens. Overcrowded living quarters became disease-producing slums; great factories were foci of many preventable diseases and occupational hazards.

Workers in mines, in smelters, and on railroads demanded more adequate protection from industrial accidents. The medical resources of industry were insufficient, and the medical needs of the families of employees were neglected. The health conditions of thousands of workers became so flagrantly bad that for its own protection management hired medical personnel to establish what is now known as industrial medicine.

Survey after survey by disinterested experts revealed that illness hit hardest among the groups least able to meet the cost of medical care. The poorer the family, the less care it received. Chronic disabilities, particularly hernia, tuberculosis, varicose veins, blind-

ness, and deafness, were much more prevalent in the low-income groups. Disparities in the infant-mortality rates between Negroes and whites and between the Southern and Northern states reflected the differences in the amount and quality of medical care.

In the first decades of this century, militant action brought about a number of health reforms. Public opinion, lay and professional, became more acutely aware of the fact that poverty and disease were tandem evils: that poverty was responsible for sickness, and that sickness in turn produced poverty. Health organizations, national and local, public and voluntary, medical and lay, were formed in large numbers, especially in the big cities. Churches rendered invaluable services by building and maintaining nonsectarian hospitals. Venereal diseases, blindness, deafness, physical handicaps, polio, and mental illnesses soon became focal points of attack. Practically all these voluntary health activities had nothing to do with the government at the beginning. It soon became clear, however, that only with government help, either through general taxation or grants-in-aid to the states, could there be any hope of solving such national problems as tuberculosis, infant and maternal mortality, immunization against contagious diseases, and old-age and mental diseases.

Where Do We Go from Here?

There can be no doubt that national and local voluntary foundations and agencies, either alone or with the cooperation of Federal and state public-health agencies, prevent much suffering and illness. But there is no standardization of techniques and services. Administration is largely in the hands of amateurs. These volunteer efforts arise in a blaze of glory and collapse because of loss of interest or lack of funds. The trend is toward more government participation, not less.

The real issue today, political sophistry and propaganda aside, is not

whether the government should help fight those diseases labeled "hands off" by the medical guild, but how far it should go. The American medical system today is a mixture of what may be called limited state medicine—or socialization through government financing and/or control—and private practice. Each is indispensable to the other. Both are responsible for the splendid progress this country has made in the science and art of medicine during the last half century.

In 1949 America spent nearly \$9.5 billion for medical care. Of this more than \$7 billion was spent for private care and more than \$2 billion for government medicine out of general taxation.

The accomplishments of government in the field of health are too many and too far-reaching to record in detail. The U.S. Public Health Service in Washington alone is responsible for forty health units. It furnishes emergency health services to Federal employees, including Senators and Congressmen. Its research covers a multitude of subjects, among them cancer, spotted fever, typhus, mumps, yellow fever, and, more recently, diabetes, heart disease, and arthritis. This Federal bureau has the approval of the most rabid "free enterprisers."

Over 19 million veterans have access to Federal medical care, which is a joint enterprise of full-time Army physicians and part-time civilian physicians. About seventy-eight per cent of all the hospital beds in the country are controlled or financed by Federal, state, or local governments. In New York City alone about fifty per cent of the people get their medical services through Federal, state, or municipal funds. In more recent years Federal participation has extended the care of the chronically ill—those suffering from tuberculosis, mental diseases, leprosy, heart disease, infantile paralysis, or cancer. Thanks to workers' compensation insurance, workers who are victims of occupational diseases and accidents are now freed of the worry of becoming public charges.

Public Responsibility

Opposition to this trend has precipitated the question: When does any health program become the responsibility of the government? There is no disagreement whatsoever about the



role of government as regards sanitation, the control of communicable diseases, and the like. Nor is there much dispute about the *principle* of public responsibility for adequate medical care. But there are wide differences of opinion as to the extent to which the principle should be applied, and as to the forms of organization that would best serve the purpose.

Twenty-five years ago the armamentarium of a physician was his bag of drugs, his prescription pad, and his stethoscope. Today he needs nurses, technicians, and secretaries to function efficiently. He must call freely on a variety of specialists. The use of laboratories, X ray, expensive new drugs, and many other diagnostic and therapeutic aids is also reflected in the patient's bill. It is not that physicians overcharge or that the services are not worth the price; it is merely that the purchasing power of the patient has not increased as fast as the cost of medical care.

The Medically Indigent


In 1946 about thirteen per cent of all families, representing 18 million people, had an annual money income of less than a thousand dollars. It is extremely unlikely that any of these families could pay for all necessary medical care.

Another fifteen per cent, or about 22

million, had incomes between one and two thousand dollars. This group might be able, with hardship, to pay for some medical care through the reduction of charges by their physicians and with the help of some prepaid voluntary insurance plans.

Nearly twenty per cent, or 28 million, had incomes in 1946 of between two and three thousand dollars, and thirty-one per cent between three and five thousand. In other words, about seventy-nine per cent of all families recorded in the 1946 survey had incomes below five thousand dollars. When we say that people in the \$2,000-\$5,000 bracket can afford voluntary prepaid health insurance, we must understand that this is not total coverage. It is limited to hospitalization, surgery, and obstetrical care. The insured receive no home or office visits, which obviously have the first call on the family budgets. Only one conclusion can be drawn from the above figures—that 40 million people in families with an annual income below two thousand dollars are certainly medically indigent. Probably another 20 million with incomes of two thousand to three thousand dollars a year will have great difficulty paying for medical care.

Even with the rise in dollar income since 1946, the possibility of heavy expense for hospital and medical care is



a source of great insecurity and anxiety to about seventy-five per cent of the American people. Under such circumstances society owes it to itself to take organized action in behalf of the sick individual and the community. If the individual cannot meet his health needs, the local community should; if the local community cannot, the state should; and if the state cannot, the Federal government should and must.


Child Health

Another controversial phase of this question centers around the health of our children. A generation ago it was the consensus of health departments and medical societies that only the children of the indigent should be furnished services for the prevention of contagious diseases with state or Federal aid. For many years the problem of mass immunization was left to the private physician. Because of the dollar barrier and because the private physicians were unable to reach a sufficiently large part of the population, especially in rural areas, the community as a whole was not protected, and many children were sacrificed.

In 1932, fewer than twenty per cent of the school children in a Midwestern city had been immunized against smallpox. Overnight smallpox struck. Within a month, more than two thousand adults and children were down with it. As usual, people clamored for a padlock after the horse was stolen.

Today any child, rich or poor, not only has access to free vaccination but also to free immunization against all the contagious diseases whose prevention is known. This service is paid for from public funds. All families have the free choice between their private doctors and the public clinic. In such a situation, no hard and fast lines can be drawn between preventive and curative care, between public and private





medicine. Wherever public health has joined hands with private medicine the former has furnished the funds and the facilities, and private physicians have administered care unhampered and for remuneration. The government or the state limits its role to financing, and to seeing that the patient gets the service. There has never been any attempt to dictate to the doctor how he should practice his art. Nor has the fear of loss of income proved a problem. Because of public education and exhortation, people get to know more about health needs and more people come to the private doctors to fulfill those needs. Today the private doctor takes care of a much larger number of well infants and examines many more school children in his office than ever before.

The best authorities are of the opinion that dependence upon the private doctor alone to diagnose and treat defects in school children resulted in the large number of draft rejections during the last war. To quote former Surgeon General Thomas Parran of the U. S. Public Health Service: "There has been almost no progress during the last twenty-five years in the decrease of incidence of physical defects amongst school children." The present system of medical inspection in our public schools is woefully inadequate, particularly in small towns and rural areas, a fact brought sharply to light in the 1938-1940 survey by the U.S. Office of Education. Of 487 cities ranging in population from ten to thirty thousand, only seventy-three per cent employed

full-time nurses and thirty-six per cent had no school physicians. In the majority of the schools the inspections were found to be superficial and casual, frequently over the clothing. With few exceptions, the services were found to be limited to first-aid diagnosis, and advice on nutrition and health habits.

For over fifty years there has been the same laying on of hands, the same recording of defects on cards, the same finding and refinding of defects. Obviously there is little use in inspecting without correcting. Why diagnose defective vision and not furnish glasses? Why record diseased tonsils and not have them taken out? The incidence of physical and mental defects will never be decreased without the assistance of state or Federal programs.

The Physician Speaks

Thus far I have spoken as a citizen. I also have a vested interest in this matter as a physician. In this capacity I have no fear whatsoever that the government will swallow me "lock, stock, and barrel." As a practitioner of medicine for forty years I have learned to regard Uncle Sam, M.D., as a fair and ethical consultant rather than as an aggressive competitor. Many a time during my four decades of observation, Uncle Sam has given lifesaving transfusions to citizens en masse. I see no reason why we of the medical profession should consider the government agencies and the voluntary agencies to be opposing and hostile forces.


Although it must be admitted that

the majority of the medical profession, as represented by organized medicine, distrust and resist government efforts in behalf of the sick individual, the rank and file, especially the more recent graduates, are becoming less resistant to "government interference" with private practice. They are beginning to realize that public clinics and health centers will benefit them professionally and financially. Many physicians now receive a considerable part of their income from public sources.

Health—a National Resource

In this day of world crisis, the waste of our manpower through illness and death is a threat to our very existence. A national health program on a long-term basis to supply adequate medical care for the bulk of our population is a national concern. It cannot be accomplished by advertising campaigns, slogans of hate, and threats against the government. Nor can we reach our goal by using horse-and-buggy methods of medical distribution. It is imperative that we dedicate ourselves to the search for what is best for the nation as a whole, rather than for ourselves as individuals or groups. It is time that we surrendered our hates and our prejudices against the government and approached this urgent domestic problem of the nation's health in the spirit of the scientist—objectively, and in search of the facts.

In the words of Dr. Charles-Edward Avery Winslow, an eminent public-health officer: "Is it not possible that politics and polemics and paid propaganda may be laid aside and that the statesmanship of competent experts may establish a sound policy of directed gradualism leading to ultimate solution of this most urgent problem of mid-century public health?"



Is McCarthy Slipping?

The Wisconsin Senator breathes defiance to other Republicans, but G.O.P. headquarters still trades on his name and message

DOUGLASS CATER

A FRIEND of mine found himself for a short time during the Second World War on a South Pacific island with Marine Captain Joseph McCarthy, now junior Senator from Wisconsin. It was during one of those monotonous waits between offensives, and the men whiled away the time in practically nonstop poker games. My friend remembers McCarthy principally for his heavy black beard and his lack of skill at poker.

"The man played as if he were possessed. He had no sense of control; he'd go the limit every hand whether he held anything or not. Then when he'd lose—and he lost all the time—he would just sit there and giggle."

The Man at the Helm

A good many people around Washington have been wondering how long McCarthy can stay in the high-stakes smear game he started early in 1950. They point out that so far not one of his charges of Communism or espionage has stuck. (Alger Hiss clearly belongs to the House Un-American Activities Committee.) Every once in a while, an optimistic reporter files a story that Joe McCarthy is beginning to slip.

On the surface, there is as yet little evidence for this. McCarthy has borne up well under the strain. He looks a little older; he is growing bald. But unlike his old opponent, Millard Tydings, who visibly went to pieces last summer and fall, McCarthy seems to thrive on smear warfare.

Around Capitol Hill, one gets the impression that McCarthy is at the helm of a large, efficient organization: an agent in Geneva watching John Carter Vincent; a carload of staff aides bent on some midnight mission with a Baltimore printer; McCarthy him-

self speaking everywhere for The Cause—and a fee. All the while, unknown teams of researchers are presumably busy on projects such as the sixty-thousand-word report on General George C. Marshall and the latest charges against the State Department twenty-nine (not to be confused with the State Department 205, fifty-seven, or eighty-one).

Occasionally, however, there are indications that the organization is not as alert and well-run as it might be. The Senator's aides seem to have made no real effort to co-ordinate or exploit the dozens of individuals and groups drawn by the magnet of McCarthyism. Not long ago, for instance, a Republican with a bona fide case against a State Department employee was given a quick brush-off by McCarthy's office. Subsequently, he took the case to the State Department, a proper hearing was held, and the employee was dismissed. His accuser still doesn't understand why McCarthy turned down such a good bet.

Publicity Sweepstakes

News stories about McCarthy's decline have special importance because his effectiveness depends wholly on publicity. If the reporters and their bosses ever are convinced that the Senator no longer supplies that ephemeral thing called news, McCarthy will be done for.

That possibility is not as remote as it might seem. Each day scores of Congressmen make pronouncements on dozens of topics, filling a closely printed record of approximately 140 pages. They issue releases, hold press conferences, and will leap to answer a summons from a reporter waiting in the antechamber. The competition for news space is grim.

McCarthy knows publicity inside out. He keeps his attacks centered on personalities instead of issues; he studs his neatly mimeographed handouts with phrases designed for banner headlines; he calculates release times to meet the convenience alternately of the morning and the evening papers; and he tries valiantly to make each outburst just a little bit different from the last.


He has backed this with sheer bluff, as when he demanded and got radio time to answer President Truman's recent speech against hysteria, in which McCarthy's name had not even been mentioned.

While delivering his latest roundhouse swing at the State Department, McCarthy explained that Senatorial immunity was protecting not him, but the press. He had offered his latest names to all three wire services in advance, he said, but they had declined to publish them. It turned out that McCarthy had demanded that the wire services carry the entire list, thus laying themselves open to possible libel claims. They naturally refused.

The Big Snooze

"If [I] went off the Senate floor . . .," McCarthy complained, "no one would hear about it except those within the range of [my] voice." Behind this statement probably lies the fear that the Senate Chamber could become as poor an amplifier as any other place. Over in the House, when John Rankin of Mississippi ranted too uncontrollably and too long, correspondents reached an unwritten compact to ignore him. It could happen to McCarthy.

This would be a hard blow to the Wisconsin Senator, whose exposés have more impact when read than when heard. For some time now, the Senate



floor has been a lonely place when McCarthy has sounded off on his favorite topic. Three or four Republicans and one or two snoozing Democrats are the only Senators on hand. McCarthy stumbles through the prepared text—copies of which have already been given to the press gallery—as if he were reading it for the first time. His voice seldom conveys anger, contempt, or scorn. He utters even the most virulent phrases unfeelingly. There are occasional snatches of erudition (“I am reminded of a wise and axiomatic utterance in this connection by the great Swedish chancellor, Exenstierna [actually, Oxenstierna] . . .”), which destroy any notion that McCarthy could have had much of a hand in preparing the speech.

Correspondents' Poll

If Senators voted on the best and worst among themselves, McCarthy would undoubtedly win the latter distinction, as he did in a recent poll of Washington correspondents. Unlike

Huey Long, Tom Heflin, and Theodore Bilbo in their day, McCarthy hasn't a single close friend in the Senate. The fault lies with him; several Senators have attempted to get close to him.

But McCarthy's unpopularity should give him no worries in connection with Senator William Benton's resolution to oust him. It is questionable whether Benton could get even a simple majority to support the move. Quite a few Democrats, while conceding that Benton has good cause, rather wish he had left McCarthy alone. They have pat reasons why they can't support a motion for expulsion. It's too late—it should have come last year. It's too near elections. Or—with great emphasis—the Senate has to be terribly careful about kicking out members.

An elderly Senator told me confidentially that Benton had made a great mistake, since opening the subject would add to the impression that the Senate is helpless to maintain high standards among its members. That such an impression is very close to the truth had not occurred to him.

Anyway, normal procedures are working to spare the Senators the embarrassment of a vote. Benton's resolution was referred to the Rules Committee and handed on to Senator Gillette's subcommittee—the same one that prepared the Maryland election report citing McCarthy for his role in Tydings's defeat. Vexed at getting all the hot potatoes, Gillette has explained wryly that the subcommittee has a couple of pretty important matters on its agenda and probably won't be able to get around to Benton's resolution before Congress adjourns.

If McCarthy riles the Democratic Senators, he is also a source of friction among the Republican Senators which could be serious to the party. Senator

Taft, as leader, has adopted the same carefully studied attitude of public indifference and private approval that a nineteenth-century gentleman might have displayed toward the village Jezebel.

On His Own

Not long ago, in a closed meeting of the Rules Committee, McCarthy sharply told Senator Wherry, Minority Floor Leader, that he didn't need Wherry's or anybody else's help. This seemed like sheer ingratitude, especially since Wherry was interceding on McCarthy's behalf to postpone publication of the Maryland election report. According to one close observer, McCarthy was expressing pent-up anger against Wherry, and indirectly Taft, for the run-around he has gotten on committee appointments this summer.

After Senator Vandenberg's death, McCarthy was bumped from the Appropriations Committee. At the time, he was assured a seat on the Republican policy committee. Then, when no member offered to resign in McCarthy's favor, Wherry moved to increase the size of the committee by one.

McCarthy chose this period to deliver his momentous attack against General Marshall—an act seemingly deliberately calculated to alienate progressive Republicans. Senator Eugene Millikin and others reportedly announced they would oppose any effort to put McCarthy on the policy committee. Taft hastily backtracked, and Wherry was given the job of mollifying McCarthy. The petition to increase the committee's size has never been taken up. McCarthy has had to content himself with two minor committee posts.

Taft's hesitancy about embracing McCarthy in the open doesn't allay the suspicions of some Republican members of Congress. They worry chiefly that, with the help of Chairman Guy Gabrielson, he may steer the Republican National Committee in the direction of McCarthyism. One bit of evidence substantiates this: The National Committee has been sending out quantities of reprints of an *American Mercury* article entitled “The Tragedy of George Marshall.” Written by Walter Trohan, a Chicago *Tribune* correspondent, it is a more concise and readable version of McCarthy's Senate attack on Marshall.

Yes, We Intervene in Greece

A design for outflanking Communism by instituting reforms is slowly emerging from the efforts of U.S. agencies there

GEORGE WELLER

MY SECOND night in Greece I went to visit the sister of an old friend. She is a state employee, now out of work, and I expected her to blame the loss of her job on the Americans. The ECA mission in Greece has helped raise still inadequate civil-service salaries by \$20 million, but it has also chopped several useless fringes from the Greek bureaucracy. But the woman's complaint was not about her job.

"Why do you Americans tolerate all these scandals in our political life?" she asked. She talked about the fuel abuses, the outrageous profits made by the trucking monopoly YEKA, the pardoning of the rich pro-Communist industrialist John Katramantos, and the frauds committed at the coal wharves of OLP, the Piraeus port authority. "Horrible, dirty scandals, and you Americans give us money without doing anything to clean them up!"

I ventured to suggest that we could not police the Greek state, but only aid it. I pointed out that these scandals were trifling, measured either by amount or by principle, when compared with the corruption in our own greatest city. "But you are too soft and easy!" she snapped. "When you let these people exploit you, you increase cynicism and make Communists of democrats. Why don't you give less and demand more?"

The fact is that we do make demands on Greece. In western Europe we have asked, by any common standard, almost nothing for what we have given. What makes Greece especially interesting is that the United States has asked more change of her than of any other power we are helping.

To this nation, no larger in population than New York City, we have given over \$2 billion. In return we have asked the Greeks to modernize

their ways of paying their bills and running their government. They have usually demurred and argued, but in general they have consented. There is certainly no gigantic plot to defraud us, such as is pictured by the extreme U.S. Right and Left. The press, which is free, roasts the errors of Americans and Greeks impartially. As a result there is a latent but real sense of partnership.

The Americans in Greece today know as much about government in Greece as they do about it at home, perhaps even more. Scandals like the ones that elude them at home elude them here. But once they are discovered, the lag in clean-up is shorter.

In Greece we intervene largely through the Cabinet and the Ministries that disburse our aid. In this respect we operate in a weaker manner than the Soviets would, and it costs us much more. The Russians pinch their Balkan peoples between the thumb of the mass organizations and the forefinger of the

state apparatus, both of which they control. What we accomplish in Greece, we do by fingertip touches on the state machine. The Soviet method is tougher and surer than our technique of giving \$50 million with each suggestion. It is faster than our practice of extracting parliamentary consent for all important changes.

Honest Tax System

Our intervention has been more thorough in Greece than it has been in France or Italy because Greece has been harder hit than the other Mediterranean countries, and hence is more compliant. We have installed an honest tax system, a reform we have proposed but never dared impose in Italy or France. We are decentralizing government in Greece, shaking off the dead hand of Athens, even though we have never dared lay a finger on Paris or Rome. We have given Greece a civil-service system without trick bonuses or fancy allowances, a reform



Marshall Planners have dared only whisper about elsewhere.

In France and Italy we have re-equipped industry with our machines, but the shops remain strongholds of Communist labor unions. The parochial Detroit idea, "Give a man a good job and he won't be a Communist," has been disproved three million times. But in Greece we have gone a little deeper than this chamber-of-commerce-luncheon belief, and the effects are much more eloquent. Greece is gradually unfolding a design for outflanking Communism by reform.

I asked a Marshall Planner how it was possible to get the Greeks, the most mercurial of Mediterraneans, to change their ways. He replied: "First we ask. Then they say No. Then we ask why not? Then we present our counterarguments. Then we yackety-yack it back and forth. If they really dislike the idea, they stall. That's politeness. The great thing about the Greeks is that they are open-minded. If the reform is good and they can do it without losing prestige, they will do it."

And if they just won't?

"Well, we get grieved. We become pained. We get hurt. And we keep on getting more hurt and more pained and more grieved until—out of sheer pity for us, and camaraderie, plus a little worry—they give a little ground. Maybe we give some, too. Then we start all over again."

And the threat of cutting down on aid? "That's the ultimate weapon, of course. We cut the aid just once, when we had a log jam of deadwood and nobody was getting anywhere. Paul Porter took \$67 million away, and they were really surprised that we had the guts to crack down. Then we put the ax away. It's still in reserve, but everybody feels better."

Unknown Hero

In order to protect Greek self-respect and not to offend individuals, the Americans crow as little as possible over the tougher reforms. The improvement in taxgathering, for example, was played down in every possible way by the Americans. As a result Craig S. Atkins, the lawyer from the Bureau of Internal Revenue who pushed it through the Greek Cabinet and Parliament, is hardly known to the Greek public, though he is a hero in the American office building.



"The best way to work," according to Russell Drake, the chief of the civil-government division, "is to show a Greek statesman a short cut through red tape, a drachma saver, or how to squeeze out an abuse. Show it to him in all humility. Try to adapt it to contain any improvement he may suggest. Then find him a way to introduce the reform so that it won't cost him prestige or patronage. Greeks are open-minded, but they won't stand for being pushed around—quite rightly."

The Americans have had several pleasant surprises, where the Greeks proved far more reasonable than expected. John Walker, a leathery, sixtyish Virginian who works under Drake, began two years ago to blow life into an old UNRRA idea: the decentralization of local government. He wanted to take the nomarchs—a nomarch heads a *nomos*, a unit of area halfway between our county and state—and make them all professional civil servants instead of politicians. These appointments are the main patronage of the Ministry of the Interior.

"I found to my surprise," says Walk-

er, "that the man who was pulling hardest with me was Zaimis, the Minister of the Interior. He was not only ready to give away his pork barrel, but eager to help me sell the idea."

This reform lay in that special twilight zone where only a foreigner could operate boldly. In Greece there are the same native lags working against reform as there are in the United States. It cannot be effected by the party in power because of patronage losses or minority opposition. But it can be imposed from above or outside—with much wringing of hands—when the responsibility can be transferred.

Often the question is not what to do but how to do it quietly. When the going was roughest in Greece, there were full-dress meetings between the Cabinet and the ECA men, tense and high-level, with ears at every keyhole and faces at every window. Twice the Americans nudged Cabinets into calling elections when the latter wanted only corridor crises.

The Greeks also have an ultimate weapon, as the Americans have found out. The Cabinet can resign, leaving the Americans nobody to deal with. The blame for the bust-up can be placed on the Americans, openly or obliquely. The drastic American counterweapon is to demand that the government face new elections.

But nobody liked this way of doing things. Now the attempt is to keep disputes in the hands of temporary committees as small as possible. Only when a reform is ready to come before Parliament or under the pen of King Paul is it formally reviewed by the Cabinet.

How to Contract Ulcers

The Americans also tried channeling all their intervention through a specially created trouble-shooting bureau called the Ministry of Coordination. The plan sounded promising, but it has had a rough career. For a while it was under Constantine Doxiades, an able and idealistic young architect with little administrative experience. Everything, Greek and American, channeled through Doxiades until he found himself in possession of hundreds of counter-crossing recommendations, like a man in a roomful of carrier pigeons. Beset with ulcers, he departed for London.

The Americans then changed the

Ministry so that it was more decentralized. However, the new Minister was George Papandreou, a party leader too agile for the Americans to cope with. Papandreou has twice outwitted the Americans in matters of reform, once in the matter of tobacco subsidies and again in the case of the big lignite (brown coal) deposits in Macedonia.

The Americans have been trying vainly to get the Greeks to eliminate two tobacco subsidies which ultimately come out of the American taxpayer's pocket. The Greeks are up to their ears in unsalable tobacco because of the drift in world taste away from the Oriental weed and toward the American. The government, however, grants huge subsidies to farmers and exporters. Papandreou outmaneuvered the Americans by announcing the new subsidy price, to be carried by the U.S. taxpayer, before Brice Mace, the ECA man responsible for agriculture, had a chance to block the play.

Papandreou gave the Macedonian mine, which may contain well over two billion tons of brown coal for cheap power, "defense priority" (meaning that it gets first chop at the incoming ECA millions), despite the fact that the U.S. taxpayer was already buying Greece a lignite-burning plant on the island of Euboea to furnish power to the Athens-Piraeus area.

Applying the Bite

American intervention works best, perhaps, in finding new tax sources. A "bearer-share" law has made it obligatory for every owner of industrial shares to reveal himself by name to the company concerned. Well over ninety-four per cent of the shares have been traced to their formerly anonymous owners, and when all results are in, the total will be almost a hundred per cent. Thanks partly to this American-imposed law, the Greek revenue from income taxes has jumped seventy-four per cent. Had a similar reform been achieved in France and Italy, much less U.S. aid would have been necessary there. In Greece the improvement is limited, because income taxes make up only fifteen to twenty per cent of the state's take.

By prodding the Greek Cabinet it has also been possible to make those Greek shipowners who have purchased Liberty ships from the U.S. on time payments to come across with about \$11

million in taxes. This victory again was the result of American insistence, but the Greeks welcomed it and carried it out firmly. This year, however, the shipowners' taxes have sunk again, and the American dream of a Greek merchant marine's making up the deficit is far from realized.

Now the insatiably uplifting Americans are trying to persuade the Greeks to do away with the old system of governors-general in Macedonia, Thrace, Epirus, Crete, and the Dodecanese. These Pooh-Bahs are a relic of times when Greek communications were poor. They annoy the local authorities by getting between them and Athens.

The Greek budget is on the verge of being self-liquidating, according to John Rees, who once cured a Chicago tax strike. With a \$30-million deficit Greece could come out even, Rees says, if next year the government would toss overboard its subsidies and the costly state marketing apparatus. The military budget is no serious drain, because the Americans pay the difference between the cost of the normal Greek Army of 80,000 and the present emergency force of 122,000.

Cheap Reforms

The paradox of the American experiment in Greece is that some of our most impressive reforms have cost us least. Many have been put through by younger men without benefit of elaborate office staffs or paperwork. Bill Kontos has cleaned up the Greek postal system, dragged the patent office out of a chaos of vertical filing, and is pushing a rural effort to get villages to build, with free materials, their own water systems, roads, and meeting halls. Bill Wild, a freight-traffic expert, first taught the Greeks in Piraeus to unload both sides of a ship and work all holds to finish up simultaneously. Then he reorganized the railroad system.

It is easy, we have learned in Greece, to intervene in the government's budget if you are paying the nation's trade deficit. Anybody will concede a few thousands of dollars' saving in the budget to get a silken cushion of millions under an unfavorable trade balance. To operate on the real patient, the trade deficit itself, is something else.

In Greece as elsewhere, the magic words at any meeting of planners are always "industry and production," without much attention being paid to

what they do to the society. But these words hit the mark better here than elsewhere because almost ninety per cent of Greece's exports are agricultural. More industry is a reasonable effort, if it does not breed more Communism. The question for the three big men of the industrial-reform program—Frederick Keppel, John T. Hermansen, and Kenneth M. Crawford, the industrial-loan adviser—was, "How can we get Greek production on a more stable footing than hitherto?"

They were trapped immediately, it seems to me, when they decided to concentrate ECA's industrial development program in Athens. Dropping industry into the overgrown metropolis, short of water, power, housing, and transport, built a wall around the future immediately. Three useful and tempting things were already in Athens: the industrialists with their hands out for ECA loans at five per cent; displaced labor from the northern ruins; and buildings. So the money for industrial loans practically had to be spent in Athens. Spent it was—ninety-four per cent of it so far—in Athens and Piraeus, with the result that the double metropolis is shorter of public facilities and more vulnerable to Communists than ever.

By 1955 our big new electrical grid





will spread power all over the country. But the first opportunity for the decentralization Greece so gravely needs has been lost. It seems to have been our way to win the battle for Jeffersonianism in government and to lose it in national economy—in both cases unconsciously.

Out on the land Greece is already a nation of small owners, like France, and hence the ECA did not face the same disheartening struggle as it does in Italy to share the most fundamental source of production, the soil.

But out on the land, as in the factory, the dilemma of efficiency does the intervening for the Americans. The Americans admit that twenty per cent fewer Greeks will have jobs on the land when growing is mechanized. But only about ten per cent of these unemployed can be picked up in the new distributive and service industries.

Although purged of its Communists, the Greek labor movement has not yet redistributed the excessive powers of Fotas Makris, the former telephone worker who heads the federation of unions. Acting for America, Alan Strachan, a lively auto worker from Detroit, hunts for potential leaders among bench workers, but the top union jobs always seem to go to white-collar men and office help. Strachan finds Greek

labor inclined to wring out security through laws rather than organization. The result is that employers are forever fearful of hiring because they cannot fire without emptying the till. So it seems easier to help a Cabinet officer than a Greek unionist.

Too Much? Too Little?

Are we intervening too much in Greece? I find three Greeks who say "No" and one who says "Not enough" for every two who say "Too much."

It is almost certain that if we had intervened more and earlier, say about a billion dollars ago, back in 1948, Greece would be better off today. Many Greek statesmen say so. Spyros Markezinis, the rightist reformer, boasts that he told the first Marshall Planners to take a wire brush to sacred Greece. "They didn't dare enforce any reforms," he says. "They lost two years deciding what to ask."

The lesson of Greece would be especially simple and pleasant if it could be read: "More intervention—less U.S. funds." Unfortunately it is not so easy as that. The battle of reform has cost only a few salaries, but the real bite on us comes in things like the industrial program, the power grid being installed by Electric Bond and Share, and the \$56-million bill for the stronger army.

Yet it is our intervention and our reforms, though blundering and experimental, and not our handouts that have won us all the gratitude we have gained in Greece. The Greeks, like other Europeans, cannot understand why, when America gives so much in aid, food and shelter are not cheaper. Neither they nor most others understand that what has been purchased with American dollars, then sold to them at market prices, takes its final aid form when their purchase money is used to finance public works. Not everybody can follow Marshall and military aid through such a labyrinth. But anybody can understand it when the Americans put themselves on record as favoring taxes for rich industrial holdings.

There remain plenty of Greek pies into which we have never put our finger, and probably never shall. One is the palace, and the other—like the stillness at the center of the storm—is Greek foreign affairs. In a way we are too deeply committed in Greece to have

much to do with its foreign policy. But as if to show us that it still is master of its fate, Greece ignores us at will in overseas policy. In the Palestine question, for example, Greece is friendly to Egyptian policy because of the Greeks in Egypt, and ignores America's lead in financing Israel.

We also keep our hands off the processes of Greek justice. In the rough early days of the "civil" war, when executions by firing squad were too quick and casual, we intervened, but too late and too mildly. Now the trials have almost ceased—as well they should after some 3,500 executions. The procedure has become more fair and legal, resuming the normally high standard of Greek justice.

To a Communist, trained in the Soviet practice of first seizing the portfolio of Justice in order to legalize annihilation of all rivals, it must seem strange that the Americans do not demand the right to run Greece's courts.

There are some seventeen thousand political prisoners still being held in the Greek islands. It seemed to me a fair test of American intervention to ask an executive on the American side of civil government what he knew about their situation and the rate of release. His reply ran: "I must tell you that I am in no position to make any estimate whatever on this subject. It is a matter I know nothing of, and have no information on which to make any sort of estimate." You would probably get about the same answer from a member of the Soviet mission in Romania, but it would mean something different.



The Magic of Nationalism

An entire continent is watching Nkrumah of the Gold Coast, the first Negro to lead the government of an African colony

PATRICK O'DONOVAN

THE NEW and sometimes terrible emotions that have changed the Far East have reached Africa. The most significant African in Africa today is no longer a great paramount chief ruling over an ancient tribe; he is a middle-aged man demanding complete self-government for a British colony.

His name is Kwame Nkrumah; his title, Leader of Government Business in the Crown Colony of the Gold Coast. He is something wholly new in Africa—an African chosen by the whole of his people irrespective of minor tribal loyalties. He controls an effective and dignified government, and is setting a precedent that will be observed wherever Africans have any access to education and any chance of expressing political opinions.

The Cocoa Coast

The Gold Coast is a square of territory under the great western shoulder of Africa, shaped arbitrarily by foreign treaty-makers. Even with the Ashanti and Northern Territories and Togoland, it is hardly larger than Great Britain and has only four million inhabitants. But after Malaya, it is the most valuable of all Britain's overseas dependencies; for it produces not only gold and strategic minerals but more than half the world's supply of cocoa as well.

Here there is none of the degrading poverty that you can find in any street in the Far East. The cocoa is grown by African farmers, and by law no European may do anything but lease land, though Europeans control most of the trade, the gold mines, and almost all the industry. Young Africans chosen by missionaries, as well as the hereditary leaders, have been coming to England for university education



Kwame Nkrumah

Black Star

for more than three generations. Missionaries—particularly the Methodists—have for years run a group of first-rate secondary schools where a minority have received their advanced education. Today Africans sit wigged and gowned as High Court judges. They occupy high places in the civil service. The Gold Coast is the most advanced colony south of the Sahara—which means Negro Africa—and is probably the most prosperous. Today it is also the most discontented and the most demanding of change.

No More Verandas

Before the war it was, from the British point of view, the ideal colony. Nothing ever happened there. A man spent his service dealing with chiefs and their councils, administering justice, trying to find enough money to build another road or a hospital, and he sat on his veranda in the evening while the sun went down into a showy decline and sipped his drink, and it all seemed as if it would go on for ever and ever. But since the war, more than thirty Africans have died in public disorders; there have been strikes and riots and looting, all conducted against

a background of nationalist thinking. The governed have withdrawn their consent.

Nkrumah is not the first African to step forward as a national leader. In the nineteenth century there were the warrior kings of the Zulus and the Ashanti who fought with spears against the encroachments of the British and the Boers in South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Guinea Coast. In 1919 a Nyasaland called Clements Kadalie succeeded in organizing a nation-wide union of African workers in South Africa, but himself destroyed it by corruption and a sort of spiteful shortsightedness. Now, under the present South African Government, such groups have lost their chance. The one thing that all Africans who tried to lead their people during the past century had in common was dismal failure.

But Nkrumah is a new sort of African nationalist. Today his continent, which up to now has been regarded merely as a field for exploitation, missionary activities, and exploration, has begun to make demands of its own at a time when its empty spaces and raw materials are needed as never before. In that continent Nkrumah now occupies almost the same sort of position that Nehru occupies in his.

Imperial Aspic

This desire for African self-rule can be seen most clearly in the British colonies because that is where it has most chance to express itself. The most discontent is not expressed where there is the most injustice. At least a degree of liberty is necessary for that, and the Latin colonies in Africa are still preserved in a sort of old imperial aspic; they are well administered, but with no latitude for political expression on



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the part of the Africans. So the conflicts take place in British Africa.

Nkrumah is a man of forty, of medium height, with a handsome, sullen face. He is still and quiet in private, a dominating, withdrawn personality. He has the politician's necessary charm, and a gift for inspiring devotion. His background is that of most of the new African nationalist leaders. He was educated in a Catholic mission school. He taught in another and saved enough money to go to America, where he was graduated from Lincoln University, in Pennsylvania. This choice of the United States rather than the British Isles was itself a rejection of the old order; the Nigerian leader, Dr. Azikwe, or "Zik" as he is known down the length of the west coast, trod precisely the same path to the same university.

American Years

Some years later, the Gold Coast authorities began to make inquiries about this period of his life. They found that the American police knew very little about him. In America, he was just another angry Negro protesting against the status of his race, and protesting against a foreign power rather than the United States. He became a professor of African history. During the Second World War he made conventional anti-imperialist speeches. He was president of the organization of Afri-

can students in the United States and Canada. Then he came to London.

He studied a little at the London School of Economics and toyed with his bar exams at Gray's Inn. But his real work was political. He was one of hundreds doing much the same thing, but he did it more professionally. He worked in obscure offices off the Gray's Inn Road—offices at the top of uncarpeted stairs, with frosted-glass doors painted with the names of unheard-of reform societies. He sat for hours in steamy cafés, talking over bad coffee, discussing the future of his people, and explaining away their failures.



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It was inevitable that he be discovered by the Communist Party of Great Britain. In fact, when he was subsequently arrested in the Gold Coast, he was found to have a party card, though it was not signed.

At that time he had vast plans for changing West Africa. He wrote about and advocated a Union of West African Soviet Republics. His opponents make a good deal of this period in his life, saying that the man is a Communist, temporarily disguising his real motives. More probably he was doing what any man in his position nowadays seems to find himself forced to do. He certainly uses Marxist clichés—and even sometimes describes himself as a Marxist—but today Communism has become, so to speak, the automatic philosophy of revolt. And if a young man is protesting fundamentally against an entrenched society, it seems that he is compelled to talk in oversimple Communist terms, to mention imperialism and exploitation and capitalist aggression, and to use Communist techniques of organization and propaganda. That the old liberal and humanist terms no longer seem strong enough is a measure of some failure in ourselves.

Tiger in the Garden

Nkrumah was invited to return to the Gold Coast late in 1947 by the United Gold Coast Convention, an organization of prominent Africans who up till then had had a safe monopoly of nationalist politics. They quickly discovered that they had invited a tiger into the garden. Nkrumah is different from other African nationalists. He is absolutely honest and absolutely single-minded. He enjoys power and applause. His presence can gather vast crowds who will wait all day in the dust and blazing sun and sing hymns to his name.

Many of his followers believe he has magical gifts, that when he was jailed each night he left the prison in the shape of a white cat. That does not make him any less vital an issue in Africa. What he has offered his people is what every African who has moved away from his tribe and people appears, however incoherently, to be seeking. He has offered to make them a nation, to make them respected and dignified, to blot out the long history of defeat and subservience. He blames

their failure and weaknesses on their foreign rulers. He offers them a new love and a new loyalty that lend a sort of depth and dignity to their poverty and ignorance. He offers them the old phrases, like "misrule" and "self-government," phrases which they can use as a treatment for their neuroses. No amount of sound administration by colonial governments can ever compete with that. Nkrumah offers all this more simply and movingly than any other African has ever done.

'Lead, Kindly Light'

Nkrumah is a great orator. He plays on his audiences rather as Hitler could play on his. After his return he very soon eclipsed all the other nationalist leaders of the Gold Coast, all the men who had made their careers in the service of this cause, and not unnaturally they resented it. An attempt was made to discipline him. But after resigning and then withdrawing his resignation, Nkrumah flung out of the hall where the party met, rushed out into the crowded street, leaped on a table and, weeping, shouted, "Listen to me! I have only one thing to say! My life is in danger!" A woman in the crowd struck up "Lead, Kindly Light," and a political movement had been born.

So he founded his own party—the Convention Peoples Party. He took no active part in the rioting that followed, but the courts three times convicted him to sedition, and he was sentenced to spend a year in prison. He was in jail in the capital, Accra, rearranging the prison library and writing his polit-



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ical manifesto when the governor of the Gold Coast announced a new constitution. Elections were held. They were the first democratic elections ever to be held in Negro Africa. Nkrumah and his followers were victorious by huge majorities. Among the opposition only the aged leader of the United Gold Coast Convention was popular enough to be elected. The governor released Nkrumah, as an "act of grace," and a fortnight later the two were photographed standing side by side on the lawn of Government House during the installation of the new Executive Council or Cabinet.

The Gold Coast does not have self-government yet. The governor still has wide powers of veto, but it is virtually impossible for him to use them without destroying the whole edifice of government. Nkrumah and his Ministers control the budget and make the laws. Half the Assembly is still elected by chiefs and traditional tribal organizations, but enough of them back the Convention Peoples Party to give Nkrumah a safe working majority. For the first time since the white men came to the continent with their guns and Bibles, an African colony has an African government.

This would be merely a curiosity if it were not for the fact that the other British colonies are observing the Gold Coast closely, and Nkrumah has already begun to interest his people in their fate. The militant nationalism that in the Far East swings so easily toward Communism is at work here. The British government has tried to meet it halfway before it turns to

frustration and bitterness. The second session of Nkrumah's Assembly is beginning; he has to present a budget and begin fulfilling some of the many promises he made his electorate. He still demands self-government, but is ready to accept it in logical stages. He has no desire to quit the Commonwealth, though he and his people tend to look on the struggle between Communism and the West as no concern of a colonial people.

'Mr. Minister'

In its first session his Government behaved with dignity and restraint. To introduce universal education, it has decided that every graduate leaving college must teach for a year in a village, even if the school is only a row of benches under a tree. His Ministers have visited Europe to find technicians, and he himself has been back to America. He is still bound to the West by his need of vast capital sums for development and irrigation. He has maintained an easy relationship with the white civil servants, who now call him "Sir" or "Mr. Minister." In the attempt to produce a modern state out of a traditional colony, he is attacking the power of the great chiefs, some of whom oppose his reforms.

The rest of Africa will not remain inert forever. There is now a chance that the West may win a series of firm and voluntary friends there rather than the open enemies and querulous neutrals such as we have in the Far East. At present the change in Africa is under the control of the man named Kwame Nkrumah.

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Blanshard's Crusade

A Catholic evaluates the latest set of charges against Rome and their effect on understanding among Americans

WILLIAM P. CLANCY

COMMUNISM, DEMOCRACY, AND CATHOLIC POWER. By Paul Blanshard. 340 pages. The Beacon Press. \$3.50.

CONSIDERABLE popular and critical acclaim has greeted *Communism, Democracy, and Catholic Power*. The theme of this book, simply stated by its author, is that the power of the Catholic Church offers a great threat to freedom in general, and to American democracy in particular. Blanshard says: "The struggle of democracy against the Kremlin is one phase of the war of ideas, and the struggle of democracy against the Vatican is another. The underlying issue in both phases of the struggle is the same—the rule of the world by free minds."

The major purpose of this book, and that of its predecessor, *American Freedom and Catholic Power*, is to warn Americans that in their struggle against world Communism they must avoid any pragmatic alliance with world

Catholicism, for the Catholic Church, or the "Vatican dictatorship" as the author prefers to call it, is just as totalitarian and hence basically as inimical to democracy as is the Moscow dictatorship. Democracy, if it is to survive, must clearly recognize the dangers of both.

The phenomenon of Blanshard's success has made him a symbol impossible to ignore. He has become the spokesman for millions of people in this country who fear and distrust the Catholic Church. It is the fact that he bears irrefutable witness to the widespread existence of this distrust which makes him so important.

The major Catholic reaction to Blanshard's books has been to attack them as distorted anti-Catholic propaganda pure and simple, and to deplore them as the cause of an increasing anti-Catholic feeling in the country. On the other hand, many non-Catholic reviewers have praised the same works

as objectively honest examinations of a delicate problem in modern society.

It seems to me, as a Catholic, that both sides have erred. Catholics should, perhaps, examine their own consciences, asking whether some of their attitudes and behavior may not have contributed to the creation of that very "anti-Catholicism" which they now deplore in Blanshard. Non-Catholics ought to examine Blanshard's evidence very carefully, making sure that his work is indeed as "objective," "scholarly," and "unprejudiced" as he claims. Because two facts make Blanshard's attitude important: In the first place, and despite his avowals to the contrary, there can be no doubt that the effect of his work is to increase anti-Catholic feeling; in the second place, the Church he describes for his readers is one in which any honest, intelligent man would find it difficult to remain.

At the very beginning of *Communism, Democracy, and Catholic Power*,

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Blanshard assures his readers that his interest in Catholicism is political rather than religious. Catholicism, as a theory of the relationship between God and men, is beyond the scope of his discussion, he tells us. What we are prepared for, then, is an objective discussion of certain problems presented by the existence of an absolute and authoritative Church functioning in a relativist and democratic society.

There can be no doubt that there is much room for such a discussion, and certainly a large number of intelligent Catholics would welcome it. For there are many of them, both clerics and laymen, who join their non-Catholic neighbors in deploring a certain type of "Catholic Action" in this country and in other parts of the world. There are a number of highly questionable attitudes, found too often among Catholics, which in fact help to create fear and distrust of the Church.

One often finds among Catholics in this country, for example, a species of mass inferiority complex. This leads to an undue sensitivity to criticism and a sort of Catholic "isolationism." And there is also a kind of exaggerated clerical management which results, among large sections of the Catholic laity, in a reluctance to face intellectual or social problems.

The Hibernian Heritage

The fact that the majority of American Catholics have their racial roots in peoples whose long memory is of poverty and suffering explains some of these elements. The predominant tone of American Catholicism, for example, has been taken from that of historical Irish Catholicism, which in turn is the result of centuries of bitter struggle to preserve the faith.

There is no reason to enumerate the many reasons why the Irish are so justly and so fiercely proud of their cultural and religious heritage. Every year these reasons are loudly rehearsed for the whole country to hear. The point is that few blessings are unmixed, and this, unfortunately, is no exception. Out of the historical struggle there has remained a sensitivity to criticism which leads large sections of American Catholics to see "anti-Catholicism" in any departure from or criticism of officially adopted Catholic positions. Thus we find a rather unedifying belligerence among some Catholics in defend-

ing their own position on public issues, and we hear Catholic voices speaking in tones more reminiscent of the partisan politician than of the representative of Christian love, understanding, and moderation. Priests and laymen sometimes seem to forget that the Catholic cause can never be secured by the methods of the lobbyist, the picket, the authoritarian censor, and the professional politician.

Unsavoury Alliances

The eagerness with which many Catholics embrace any public movement or personality which seems to favor the cause of the Church against its enemies has certainly led, historically, to highly unsavoury alliances between the forces of religion and the forces of political and social reaction. This eagerness can be described as a form of Catholic "isolationism," because it is born of a narrowly partisan and shortsighted view which regards friendship for the Church as the measure to be used in determining the worth of temporal régimes. The unhappy Catholic apologists for the Franco dictatorship in Spain, as well as the Catholic defenders of the Senator McCarthys in this country, are clearly guilty of an appalling lack of vision. If Catholics are to escape the charges of narrowness, fascism, and reaction, they must learn that their partisanship is as ugly as all other forms of partisan-

ship, and that when the freedom and dignity of any man are debased, all men are debased.

Then too, the role that the clergy has historically played in the country from which the most influential group of American Catholics has come has resulted in a type of clerical paternalism which is the cause of much of what Blanshard deplors. Besides his strictly spiritual functions, the priest in Ireland enjoyed a unique position as the cultural and political mentor of his people. It was to the priest, traditionally, that the people looked for guidance on all questions, because it was, indeed, usually only the priest who was equipped to offer guidance to his flock.

"The people must always listen to their priests" may have been a necessary working axiom for generations of otherwise leaderless peasants. But carried over, as it often is, to the twentieth century, it suggests an anachronism which is doubly harmful: It tends to produce an arrogant, complacent clergy; it leads to a subservient laity.

There can be little doubt that all these things are, in varying degrees, present and operative among Catholics, and all of them invite honest criticism from both Catholic and non-Catholic observers. When they lead Catholics, individually or en masse, to favor reactionary leaders and movements merely because they may seem to promote the interests of the Church (the rank-and-file Catholic support of any and all vociferous "anti-Communists," for example), and to the use of force and pressure on the community, they demand the opposition of all honest men.

'Yardstick of Democracy'

Certainly no Catholic has the right to quarrel with Blanshard in his criticism of these elements in Catholicism; they are forces to which many Catholics are as opposed as is he. One of the earliest lessons every Catholic must learn is to distinguish between his Church as it exists essentially, in its dogma and sacraments, and the Church as it operates in time, subject to all the pitfalls of humanity and history. When Catholics err at the cultural and political level, their errors become the concern of all men, Blanshard included. This concern leads him to his real thesis.

The Catholic Church as it has devel-



oped in history, Blanshard tells us, has no connection with primitive Christianity. It is essentially a vast political conspiracy to control the mind of man. In order to attain this end the Church has always resorted to persecution, the exploitation of superstition, the suppression of truth, and "the arbitrary manufacture of dogma." The great mass of Catholics have always been deliberately kept in ignorance and superstition because, once freed from them, they would reject the Church. Since the Church is essentially absolutist in its teaching and authority, it is therefore anti-democratic. Consequently, no Catholic can be a real believer in democracy. Blanshard cites evidence from history, from the activities of contemporary Catholics, from Catholic teaching, and from an examination of the structure of the Church. His "yardstick" for measuring "political Catholicism" is, he tells us, "American democracy."

Historically, Blanshard recounts in great detail the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition, and dwells on the heresy hunts of the post-Reformation period. He parades the religious intolerance of the ages in order to prove that the Church has always been committed to a policy of suppressing the views of its adversaries.

He reminds us of the reactionary turn of much Catholic political action in the twentieth century: the concordat between the Vatican and the Fascist Italian state in 1929, the strong Catholic support of the Franco régime in Spain, the acclaim which Catholics in this country have given McCarthy.

He cites Catholic teaching on papal authority as "anti-democratic," and assures us that it has "no foundation" in Scripture. He objects to the fact that

Catholics will not accept the decisions of American courts on divorce, and demands the abolition of separate religious schools as "hostile" to the democratic spirit.

Finally, applying his "yardstick of democracy," Blanshard demands that the Church itself "catch up with" western civilization. There should be a tribunal, "something like the American Supreme Court," for pronouncing on the judgments of the Pope. Popular suffrage should be introduced into the Church and Catholic teaching should conform to "majority opinion."

On the face of it, Blanshard's evidence may seem impressive, and his consequent thesis may appear proved. The Inquisition did burn heretics; Catholics have supported reaction and suppression; the Church is "absolutist" in its structure and teaching. Before too readily accepting this evidence, however, we must test it for relevancy, completeness, accuracy, and meaning in the whole context of "the Church." Subjected to these tests, some shattering doubts arise.

Is a Church a State?

In order to criticize anything, we must understand and criticize it in the light of its own nature and by the principles which are proper to it. This follows from the fact that one thing is not another; the Church, for example, is not the state, and vice versa. To con-

fuse the two can lead to the most terrifying consequences for both. This confusion, unfortunately, lies at the very basis of Blanshard's book.

The author's whole critique of Catholicism rests on his shocked recognition that the Church is not a democracy, and democracy is, for Blanshard, the standard by which all things are judged. By first elevating democracy to the status of a religion, any departure from which must be condemned, and then by ignoring the fact that the Church is essentially not a political but rather a spiritual society, he finds it easy to prove that the Church is an archenemy of the democratic state.

But the Church and the state are unique and separate entities. The one has as its end the supernatural, the other the natural end of man. For a Catholic there are indeed controversial problems to be resolved in an age like our own, when the state has become completely secularized. But to confuse the two entities, as Blanshard does, solves nothing, and his criticism of the Church as an authoritarian society is as unreal as the strictures of some nineteenth-century theologians on "the modern state" for being democratic. Both lead down the dark road to a secularized Church or a theocratic state.

Because of his basic failure to see that the Church is not the state, Blanshard's critique of Catholicism as an "absolute power" crumbles. The Church's claim to authoritative teaching powers rests on a theological foundation, and clearly stands or falls on a critique of that foundation, which must itself be theological. Blanshard admits that he is unqualified to make any such critique, and insists that his discussion of Catholicism is purely "political." The difficulty is that a critique of Catholicism on a purely political level is not a critique of Catholicism at all, but only of the attitudes of certain Catholics on the political level. The Church is essentially "a theory of the relationship between God and man," and must be considered as such. Here the "yardstick of democracy" is meaningless.

The historical and contemporary arguments which bolster Blanshard's thesis are a rather startling mixture of the true but irrelevant, the half-true, and the blindly false.



Blanshard dwells at great length on the power of the Papacy and the awe in which it is held by the majority of Catholics. He tells us that no Catholic dare question the wisdom or motives of any Pope. He laments the "party line" of Catholicism.

Catholicism's Catholicity

One cannot discuss the "party line" of Catholicism seriously unless he understands what is essential and what is nonessential to Catholicism. It is true that every professing Catholic is united in accepting what the Church proposes as matters "of faith." But to discuss Catholic unanimity in support of fascism, reaction, "Holy War," and censorship, as Blanshard does, betrays a shocking disregard for fact. Catholics can be found on every side of most political and social questions, and one

cannot, for instance, talk about Catholic support for Franco Spain without mentioning the bitter opposition to Franco by some of the most militant and distinguished Catholics in Europe. To describe the social and political thinking of modern Catholics as unanimously, or even largely, reactionary or anti-democratic is so obviously untrue that it needs no refutation. In Spain itself there is a liberal Catholic opposition to Franco, and the best Catholic political thought of this century, especially in France, has been democratic, progressive, and anti-fascist.

The tragedy is that many of the things Blanshard says are true, but, put together, they do not mean what he would have us believe they mean. The facts of the Inquisition, of censorship, of political reaction among Catholics are true, but they are as ultimately

irrelevant to the real meaning of the Church as Radio Moscow's recitals of lynchings, riots, and wage slaves are irrelevant to the meaning of America.

A Catholic and an American can deny neither recital, but he knows that neither defines his Church or his country. And he bitterly resents the fact that in the telling so much else is being ignored.

Thousands have taken Blanshard as a responsible and serious critic of Catholicism. For this, Blanshard has much to answer. Because whatever incidental service his books, speeches, and propaganda may render by reminding Catholics of their own shortcomings, their ultimate effect is to darken the clouds of slander, confusion, misunderstanding, and fear that hang all too heavily at this time over the American scene.

Reflections on Hearst

A Socialist who once nearly voted for him recalls the young reformer who turned into an old demagogue

NORMAN THOMAS

IN THE FALL of 1905, I was a very unsophisticated young man just out of Princeton and had gone to work in a church and settlement house in what was then a poor and tough district on New York's West Side. That was the year the late William Randolph Hearst first ran for mayor as the candidate of the Municipal Ownership League. I wasn't quite old enough to vote nor was I then a Socialist, but I was something of a reformer, deeply interested in politics, and I was torn in my political allegiance.

I had been brought up to dislike Tammany Hall but equally to distrust and dislike that flamboyant yellow journalist, Hearst. Here he was making a pretty good campaign, I thought,

against corruption and reaction in politics. But he was still the same cynical demagogue who preached a virtue he never practiced. I was almost glad that I couldn't vote.

That year Hearst lost an election that Tammany probably stole. Somebody managed to dispose of a lot of ballot boxes in the East River before they could be recounted. The next year, Hearst ran for governor as a candidate of a party still controlled by the political machine which he had so violently attacked the year before. His Republican opponent was Charles Evans Hughes, fresh from his achievement in showing up insurance scandals. Hearst, I remember, looked at his whiskers and called him "an animated feather dust-

er," and I found real satisfaction in casting my first vote for an eminent Republican. (That, however, never became a habit.)

Hearst continued his role as a kind of urban Populist until 1909, when he ran unsuccessfully as the candidate of the Independence League—no longer the Municipal Ownership League—and was decisively defeated in an election in which the count was probably as honest as any in the days of the domination of Tammany Hall before the advent of voting machines and Mayor LaGuardia. I was no longer tempted to vote for him.

I should not have taken space for this personal history if I did not think that the ambivalence of my attitude



toward Hearst in 1905 was to a considerable degree characteristic of the ambivalence of the American public toward him during the various stages of a career made consistent only by his completely amoral drive for power. In relation to that career our American democracy showed both its weakness and its strength. It allowed itself to be corrupted by Hearst's type of journalism. It permitted this cynical but able demagogue to acquire wealth, power, and control over the minds of men such as no man should ever have. But there was in it sufficient wisdom and strength to refuse to the demagogue the supreme political power he persistently sought.

Wars Made to Order

Hearst's was no success story in the American rags-to-riches tradition. The playboy son of a very rich father, he

had behind him family money when he launched his spectacular career in journalism. He soon made it pay. The young man who bought the failing New York *Morning Journal* on October 7, 1896, and began his spectacular struggle with Joseph Pulitzer, publisher of the *World*, was by 1898 enough of a power to be principal author of the Spanish War—a fact I didn't fully realize back in 1905, but which has been well established by historians, notably Walter Millis.

The war itself was for Hearst mostly a circulation stunt. The real attitude of this flamboyant patriot and humanitarian was undoubtedly expressed in his famous telegram to the artist Frederic Remington, whom he had sent to Cuba to draw pictures of the insurrection that had been in progress since 1895. Remington telegraphed asking permission to come home, as everything was

relatively quiet. Hearst sent his famous wire in reply: PLEASE REMAIN. YOU FURNISH THE PICTURES AND I'LL FURNISH THE WAR. He succeeded in creating the atmosphere which made President William McKinley fear to tell Congress or the people that the Spanish government had acceded to the American ultimatum on Cuban reform. And so the war began.

By the turn of the century, Hearst was attacking President McKinley so bitterly that there was some ground for the widespread feeling that he was partly responsible for the assassination of the President by Leon Czolgosz. His *Journal*, shortly after Governor Goebel of Kentucky had been shot to death, published these lines by Ambrose Bierce:

The bullet that pierced Goebel's breast

*Cannot be found in all the West.
Good reason, it is speeding here
To stretch McKinley on his bier.*

By 1903, the publisher of two popular papers in New York had recovered enough public support to be elected to Congress, in which he served two terms and made something of a record for absenteeism. In 1904, none other than Clarence Darrow seconded his nomination for President at the Democratic National Convention. Hearst received 200 votes against 658 for Judge Alton B. Parker.

Then followed his adventures in New York City politics, to which I have referred. After 1909 he was never again a candidate himself, but he acquired a kind of vicarious power as the principal backer of the personally honest but stupid John F. Hylan. Despite Hearst's success in forcing the Democratic Party to re-elect Hylan as mayor in 1921, the next year he fell rather easily before Alfred E. Smith, who refused to run again for governor if Hearst's name should be put on the ticket for Senator. In 1925 Governor Smith made final the political rout of Hearst in New York politics when he easily beat Hearst's effort to renominate Hylan for a third term. Only once, briefly, did Hearst have any direct political power, and that, ironically, was in the Democratic convention of 1932, when he collaborated with John N. Garner of Texas to throw enough California votes to Roosevelt to nomi-

nate him on the fourth ballot. Hearst was soon to fight Roosevelt as bitterly as he had fought McKinley.

I cite this record of comparative political failure because on the whole it illustrates the considerable ability of the American people to judge and reject a power-seeking demagogue, whether he functions as the younger Hearst, the progressive reformer, or as the older Hearst, the great defender of the "American Way"—a way identical with the economic policies which made his empire possible.

A Power for Evil

Yet the repudiation of Hearst was by no means so complete as to destroy his indirect power, mostly for evil, in the field of journalism and hence of politics. The main instigator of the Spanish-American War was, for his own reasons—mostly hatred of Great Britain and Russia—an opponent of American entry into the First and Second World Wars. But once we were in the wars, no patriot was so flamboyant or so intolerant to opposition to them. During the 1920's, he was the advocate of intervention in Mexico, in which he held large financial interests. That intervention would have meant war. At one time, his papers published a document purportedly signed by the Controller General of Mexico which authorized paying large sums to U.S. Senators in the Mexican interest. The document was proved to be a forgery by a Senate inquiry. It was a forgery which Hearst never properly explained, and was not the only one his papers carried.

Indeed, the success of the Hearst type of journalism proved, even before the advent of Hitler and Stalin, the efficacy of the Big Lie. Told often and brazenly enough, it will win wide acceptance. In an American journalism not too scrupulous for truth, the Hearst papers were conspicuous offenders. In my considerable experience, it was harder to get a correction of a misstatement in a Hearst paper than in any other American journal except the *Daily Worker* or the *Reader's Digest*. (The latter only digests material which its editors consider suitable for the American intellectual diet, and it doesn't even have a letters column to record protests.)

Few men in history have made more intellectual prostitutes than Hearst in



his long career. He paid able writers very high to sell their honor and their consciences to him, and he usually treated them with cynical contempt. In matters in which he was interested he ruthlessly imposed his own point of view. His formula for journalistic success was to exploit unscrupulously the sensational in the field of sex, crime, and scandal, while professing the most pious virtue in editorial essays on morals.

The usual justification for this sort of journalism is that "it gives the public what the public wants." Perhaps, but in the process it deliberately depresses public standards and encourages a hypocrisy and a failure in moral discrimination immensely dangerous to democracy.

It was rarely possible for Hearst's critics to say that his papers were bad and only bad. Occasionally they carried good stuff and, for whatever reason, advocated some good causes. They made it hard for honest men to apply to them the same absolute standards of black or white which the Hearst papers themselves cynically applied in the journalistic campaigns ordered by their master in the interests of his own profit and power.

Thomas Jefferson and the optimists of his day, when our country was young, believed that if the press were free of any sort of government censorship or control, automatically the public would be well served. What would Jefferson say if he could contemplate Hearst's empire? This, although fortunately shrunk from the height that it had reached before 1935, included at his death eighteen newspapers, nine magazines, three radio stations, and such widely distributed services as International News Photos, the International News Service, the *American Weekly*, the King Features Syndicate, and their subsidiaries. How do you compete with such an empire? And how do you obtain from its cynical master a decent regard for the public's right to hear facts and to make up its own mind concerning truth?

Pallbearers of Distinction

In every sense the Hearst empire of communication, with its control over men's minds, is part of the world of big business. At his death, no man could estimate the entire extent of Hearst's wealth and power. He owned gold and

silver mines and real estate. He lived in a feudal barony in California which at one time comprised 330,000 acres and shut off from the public fifty miles of the beautiful California coast. Hearst had some special interest in defending an economic system which gave him such breath-taking power and wealth, and made it possible for him to collect and hoard all sorts of artistic creations of the men of the past.

Hearst's empire shrank in the 1930's but was considerably strengthened after the Second World War. Through it all Hearst was Hearst. When finally death came, it appeared that he had acquired honor as a great American patriot. The list of honorary pallbearers was a far better roster of America's men of distinction than Calvert whiskey advertising has been able to compile. In part this was the tribute we strange creatures pay to him who lords it over us. But in part it was a sign that in our country today, vehemence of opposition to Communism can sanctify almost any other betrayal of democracy. The anti-Communist, especially if he is absolute master of eighteen newspapers, whatever his character, becomes a patriot if not a saint, cleansed by the passion of his denunciation of Stalin and his zeal in fomenting suspicion of every liberal as Stalin's tool. Witness the tributes to Hearst at his death from political leaders as prominent as Herbert Hoover and churchmen as high as Cardinal Spellman.

Fame and Honor

To the layman it would appear that on the public record, William Randolph Hearst had broken most of the commandments held dear by the Church. But of him Cardinal Spellman said: "I mourn the death of a great American patriot, William Randolph Hearst, who fought battles on many fronts for all that America signifies and who leaves to posterity traditions to continue the fight for freedom and justice that will encourage and inspire Americans for generations." It would appear that "Thou shalt hate Stalin with all thy mind and soul and strength" is the first and greatest commandment. And the second is: "Thou shalt successfully lord it over thy neighbors." On these two, apparently, hang fame and honor.

Is this the code which will make and keep our democracy great, strong, and free?

Rich Richard's Almanac

THE BUSINESSMAN'S BOOK OF QUOTATIONS.
By Ralph L. Woods. McGraw-Hill. \$4.

AN ANXIOUS CONCERN for the future may have something to do with the prevalence of efforts on the part of some advertisers to boost the American Way of Life in ways that until recently were not considered necessary. Reference is made to the practice (adopted by quite a few large concerns) of advertising not products but the conditions under which products are manufactured. ("... if we can set just one American boy straight in his thinking," a machine-tool company has declared, "here's one bunch of business men who will feel they have done something just as important as making even the finest turret lathe in history.")

A new weapon for the defenders of American business, which, if its own financial reports are to be given credence, never had it so good, has been brought forward by Ralph L. Woods, a consultant for the National Association of Manufacturers. In his "frequent need for appropriate quotations applicable to the various phases and problems of current business," Woods "turned to the four or five standard books of quotations, but often came away empty-handed." To fill this gap, he has prepared a new anthology, "specifically designed to fit the special requirements of businessmen."

Back Roads and Superhighways

The quotations have been conveniently arranged under subject headings, ranging in variety from "Ambition" through "Closed Shop," "Picketing," and "Social Security" to "Welfare State." Suppose a businessman wanted to point out rather forcefully that things are going to hell in a hurry: He could choose, depending upon his mood, between Herbert Hoover's warning that: "through governmental spending and taxes our nation is blissfully driving down the back road to [collectivism] at top speed..." and Senator Harry Flood Byrd's opinion:

"We are racing down a four-lane superhighway which terminates in Socialism..."

Or suppose it is a question of throwing the lie in the teeth of a parlor pink on the subject of wealth. Hear how Andrew Carnegie has described millionaires: "The bees that make the most honey, and contribute most to the hive even after they have gorged themselves full."

The personage most frequently quoted is none other than Franklin D. Roosevelt, who, with thirty-eight citations, finishes well ahead of even Adam Smith. More than a third of F.D.R.'s quotations were selected from his public utterances during that interesting period before he became President, while he was excoriating the Hoover Administration for deficit financing, for "government by oligarchy" and "master minds," for the fact that "Government—Federal and State and local—costs too much," as well as for threatening "the preservation of... home rule by the State..."

Keynes vs. Keynes

Similarly, John Maynard Keynes, whom the index of authors introduces as an "English economist whose theories greatly influenced President Franklin D. Roosevelt" is quoted, against himself as it were, on the matter of foreign aid: "If I had influence at the United States Treasury, I would not lend a penny to a single one of the present governments of Europe. They are not to be trusted with resources which they would devote to the furtherance of policies in repugnance to which... the Republican and Democratic parties are probably united."

The fact that the foregoing was written in 1919, when the dispositions of Keynes, the governments of Europe, and perhaps even of American political sentiment, may have been somewhat different from what they turned out to be later, will probably not trouble those readers who are sure to find this book agreeable and useful.

—ROBERT K. BINGHAM



One phase of the occupation of Japan: A modern police force has been organized





Medal of Honor



Master Sergeant Travis Watkins, of Gladewater, Texas—Medal of Honor. On September 3, 1950, near Yongsan, Korea, Sergeant Watkins was wounded and paralyzed from the waist down. Ordering his squad to pull out and leave him, he stayed behind and died covering their withdrawal.

Sergeant Watkins gave his life for freedom. What can you do?

This. You can begin today to do your share in defense of the country he defended far "above and beyond the call of duty" by buying more . . . and more . . . and more United States Defense* Bonds.

For your Defense Bonds strengthen America. And if you will make our country strong enough now, American boys may never have to give their lives again. Defense is *your* job, too.

Remember that when you're buying bonds for national defense, you're also building a personal reserve of cash savings. Remember, too, that if you don't save *regularly*, you generally don't save at all. So go to your company's pay office—now—and sign up to buy Defense Bonds through the Payroll Savings Plan. Don't forget that now

every United States Series E Bond you own automatically goes on earning interest for 20 years from date of purchase instead of 10 years as before. This means, for example, that a Bond you bought for \$18.75 can return you not just \$25 but as much as \$33.33! For your country's security, and your own, buy U. S. Defense Bonds now!

****U.S. Savings Bonds are Defense Bonds - Buy them regularly!***



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